/i/1302867960.png?fit=%2C&ssl=1)
The Dutch intelligence services gave incorrect information to the supervisory authority TIB several times last year. The MIVD also tried to intercept journalists and lawyers at the request of foreign security services, although that procedure has since been improved.
In its annual report, the Assessment Committee on Powers of Deputies indicates that the General Intelligence and Security Service has repeatedly provided the supervisory authority with incorrect information. The TIB published the final annual report on Tuesday after a delay. A condensed report was published earlier this year. The TIB ensures that GISS and MIVD comply with the Intelligence and Security Services Act of 2017.
The earlier report already showed that the intelligence services went wrong less often last year than the year before. Between April 2019 and April 2020, the AIVD misused its powers in 1.7 percent of cases. This was 3.1 percent for the Military Intelligence and Security Service.
In several cases, the MIVD tried to eavesdrop on lawyers and journalists. It is not clear whether this happened consciously and whether it actually took place. The problem lay with drawing up ‘selection lists’, which the MIVD receives from foreign intelligence services when they ask for help with the interception of data. The selection list shows which communication must be tapped. ‘Repeatedly’ law firms and news agencies appeared on those selection lists.
The TIB has informed the intelligence services and the ministry about this. New lists were then submitted without that information. According to the MIVD, there has been better supervision internally. “The TIB has since found no lawyers or journalists on selection lists,” writes the regulator.
According to the TIB, GISS has sent incomplete or incorrect information to the supervisory authority several times. This concerned information that the TIB said was necessary for the assessment of a tap request, but which the Director-General of GISS said was irrelevant. At other times, too, the General Intelligence and Security Service provided incomplete or incorrect information, “whether or not consciously.”
The AIVD also tried several times to extend a tap on the cable when this was not justified. With such a ‘research assignment-oriented interception on the cable’ or OOG, the service tried to extend the period before that. The investigation itself was also expanded, which was illegal according to the TIB.
The TIB also warns that bulk hacks that intelligence agencies run are “at odds with the requirements of proportionality and targeting.” This happens in particular if the services perform a hack and thereby collect information in bulk. This is an ‘undirected acquisition’, but sometimes the irrelevant data is deleted after collection. “There is actually research assignment-oriented hacks,” writes the TIB.
–
