Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin continues to use the threats of increased nuclear preparednessto appease a nationalist public and intimidate the West.
This was reported by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in its daily analysis of the situation in Ukraine.
Analysts note that the Russian dictator’s statements about nuclear weapons, especially the Avangard hypersonic warheads or the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles, do not mean that Russia is preparing to use them.
“The Kremlin regularly uses nuclear rhetoric to demonstrate strength to the Russian far-right community, which has accused the Russian Defense Ministry of not taking aggressive enough steps to support the war in Ukraine and has demanded that the West cut “increasing” aid to Ukraine and continue negotiations on Russian terms, hinting at the possibility of a nuclear escalation,” ISW explained.
The experts also added that after analyzing previous cases where Russian officials have invoked nuclear weapons to influence Western and domestic publics, they have come to the conclusionthat Kremlin officials would not dare to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield.
On December 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu chaired the Russian Defense Ministry (MoD) collegium in Moscow and made key statements, relating to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and the strategic direction of the Russian army.
The Kremlin has stepped up its intelligence operations, accusing NATO expansion of posing a military threat to Russia. Shoigu said NATO’s military expansion near Russia’s borders, including Finland’s and Sweden’s bids for NATO membership, made it necessary “appropriate” Russian response to create a group of Russian forces in northwestern Russia. Senior Kremlin officials have said Nordic countries joining NATO will not threaten Russia in spring 2022.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Finland and Sweden joining NATO would pose no existential threat to Russia in April 2022, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Finland’s and Sweden’s accession Sweden to NATO would not make “a big difference” in May 2022.
Shoigu has publicly presented a number of proposed changes in Russia’s defense policy that would significantly increase the size of the Russian military. Shoigu suggested Russia do it restored the military districts of Moscow and Leningrad, to form a new army corps and create 17 new maneuver divisions. Shoigu proposes that Russia form a new corps in Karelia, two new airborne divisions, three new motorized rifle divisions in the occupied Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, and expand seven existing brigades of the Northern Fleet and Western, Central Military Districts and Eastern into seven new motorized rifle divisions, expanding the existing five Marine brigades into five Marine divisions. Shoigu also proposed that Russia form five artillery divisions to bolster military districts.
He suggested increasing the size of the Russian armed forces up to 1.5 million servicemen, including 695,000 indentured workers (as of spring 2021, Shoigu said 380,000 Russians were indentured workers), gradually raising the conscription age from 18 to 21, and raising the age limit for conscripts from 27 to 30 years. Shoigu did not specify a time frame for these measures.
This isn’t the first time the Russian Defense Ministry has signaled its intention to roll back Serdyukov’s 2008 reforms, which largely disbanded Russian Ground Forces divisions in favor of autonomous brigades. Since 2013, the Russian Defense Ministry has gradually reversed Serdyukov’s reforms by restoring maneuver divisions in Russian military districts.
However, the Kremlin is highly unlikely to build such a large conventional force in a time frame relevant to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Division formation is costly and time consuming. For example, it took the Russian military more than a year to do this reform of the 150th motorized rifle division in 2016-2017
The February 24 confirmation of Putin’s goals shows that the Kremlin has decided to accept the casualties of the war and try to move on to victory. The Kremlin will have to continue to demand and justify great sacrifices from its people to pursue these unrealistic goals. Shoigu tried to justify the public cost of the mobilization by admitting that the mobilization was a “serious test” for Russian society needed to defend newly acquired territories in Ukraine.
Basic extracts
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has proposed a series of sweeping reforms and goals to strengthen Russian forces that Russia is highly unlikely to complete in time to be relevant to the ongoing conflict.
- Putin and Shoigu confirmed Russia’s maximalist goals for war in Ukraine.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin has stepped up efforts to make peace with the critical pro-war nationalist community. Russia’s failures to achieve Putin’s stated goals threaten the Kremlin’s efforts to regain control of the domestic narrative and set the stage for a second year of war.
- Russia’s nuclear rhetoric is most likely an attempt to appease domestic audiences and intimidate Western audiences, rather than an indicator of preparations for the use of nuclear weapons.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Washington on December 21. ISW will report on the details of Zelensky’s visit and Russian reactions to the December 22 visit.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks along the Svatovo-Kremina line.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut regions and the city of Donetsk.
- A Ukrainian official confirmed that Russian forces had tried unsuccessfully to establish control over islands in the Dnieper Delta.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu praised the growing movement of Russian cadets from the National Youth Army Movement (Yunarmia).
- Russian officials have stepped up their crackdown on law enforcement aimed at deterring guerrilla activities and targeting guerrilla sympathizers.
