/ world today news/ The RAND Corporation, which carries out analytical research on behalf of the US Department of Defense, published another report last week on the topic of the Arctic and the capabilities of its armed forces in this region.
We recall that the US Army’s Arctic Strategy was published in March 2021. CSIS also published a report on strategic competition in the Arctic in early 2021, which “Catehon” previously reviewed.
The United States has access to the Arctic region and regular strategies and initiatives in relation to it – this is a certain norm. In addition, the RAND report was published under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security’s Think Tank.
However, it is necessary to take into account the current geopolitical circumstances and the de facto absence of any interaction between Russia and other countries that are geographically located in the Arctic.
In September 2023, Russia withdrew from the Barents Council, and the activities of the Arctic Council were effectively suspended due to the sanctions and counter-sanctions regime. Therefore, it is worth paying attention to this report, and especially to the nuances that are not related to the internal security of the United States.
In the general part it says:
The United States has significant interests in the Arctic and is one of only eight countries with territory in the region… Russia continues to maintain and modernize a large-scale, credible military capability in the Arctic.
Moreover, China’s growing economic and scientific aspirations in the region could allow it to expand its influence and capabilities there.
In addition to strategic competition and growing concern about tensions between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (which may yet increase as the war in Ukraine intensifies in 2022), the US military, particularly the US Coast Guard (USCG), is to address security, law enforcement, judicial, other homeland and national security, and environmental challenges in the region.
From 2021, the US Congress raises the question of the need to report on the capabilities of the armed forces in the Arctic. Such reports raise two research questions:
How do the capabilities of the US military differ from those of other countries operating in the Arctic, including Russia, China and various US allies and associates?
To what extent are foreign military and commercial entities operating in parts of the Arctic inaccessible to US forces, particularly in the high seas area, and what potential risks might these activities and any regional access differences pose to USCG forces and national interests of the US?
According to the report, the US military’s most pressing needs for access and presence in the Arctic fall into the following categories:
– assets located in close proximity to support bases;
– multispectral awareness and communication;
– response infrastructure and logistics;
– a sufficient number of trained, currently active employees with the skills to work in these harsh conditions;
– tactics and equipment for incidents with low probability and high consequences;
– the ability to scale your presence.
Comparing U.S. capabilities in the Arctic with those of other Arctic nations, the research team noted that each of the four attributes—capability, priority, potential, and interoperability—constrains U.S. access and presence in the Arctic.
Most importantly, the US military faces a lack of capacity in the region to address strategic security interests in the ways articulated in national, agency, and service Arctic strategies. The country simply does not have the polar capabilities and trained personnel to maintain a sustained presence across the region at the scale required.
It is also notable that the regional capabilities of other Arctic entities tend to be scaled according to their geography, needs and interests. In contrast, despite its polar interests, the United States faces significant capacity gaps in many areas.
For example, at the time of writing, the USCG had two operational polar icebreakers: the half-century-old heavy icebreaker USCG Cutter (USCGC) Polar Star and the medium-sized icebreaker USCGC Healy.
Historically, except for the period when USCGC Polar Star was temporarily decommissioned pending an overhaul from 2006 to 2012, the current fleet is the smallest in 60 years. In the early 1960s, the USCG had eight icebreakers capable of operating in the Arctic or Antarctic.
The authors conclude that inaction could lead to several types of risks to US regional interests, including the following:
– potential inability to fulfill obligations (eg search and rescue and response to oil spills);
– loss of life, property, economic potential and integrity of the environment;
– restrictions on the ability to work and rely on partners;
– increased Russian control and potential for aggression, combined with a loss of opportunity to engage in positive diplomacy;
– expansion of China’s regional influence;
– accidental escalation of tensions between NATO and Russia;
– global perceptions of US absence and security gaps that would exacerbate some other risks;
– lack of control over arctic narratives.
Apart from the first two points, which relate directly to the internal affairs of the US, all the others are related to the global presence and positioning of Washington’s interests.
The report makes the following recommendations:
– Regularly updating strategy documents, formalizing actions and cooperation through implementation plans, advocating for a stronger focus on the Arctic in national-level strategies and plans as appropriate, and continuing to engage with other US government agencies and foreign partners , which would help provide momentum and continuity to these efforts, and which are taking place in conjunction with the reorganization of Arctic services.
– Funding for additional icebreakers to address some of the presence gaps so that the USCG can have a simultaneous presence in both the western and eastern US Arctic and in the various approaches to these areas, in addition to fulfilling responsibilities in the Arctic.
Adding icebreakers would also increase the likelihood that an icebreaker would be close enough to any event in the Arctic to respond effectively and promptly.
However, planning for future icebreaking capabilities must take into account that most of the regional activity will occur during the increasingly long warm months, so other vessels with suitable strengthening or hardening can also be used for backfilling of some of the capacity gaps.
Let’s note that the directive on the construction of new icebreakers was signed under Donald Trump, but nothing has changed since then.
– Construction of a deepwater port in Nome, Alaska. This will create a more powerful key maritime logistics hub in the US Arctic, located more than 700 miles north of Dutch Harbor in southern Alaska.
The vast distances in the Arctic make it difficult to respond within days in many places where there is no port infrastructure to accommodate ships and support operations.
– Increasing the use of naval assets along the New England coast to support US Arctic operations.
The Atlantic base is particularly important to improve response and uptime near Canada and Greenland, as well as in the European Arctic.
– Establishing a partnership with Canada as their Arctic fleet can support US Arctic operations in eastern North America and Europe. In general, there is talk of strengthening international cooperation.
However, apart from Canada and Russia, the other countries in the Arctic region are far from the US borders. Now cooperation with Russia is impossible.
Therefore, only Canada remains. At the same time, it is important to note the fact that the US and Canada have disputed territories in the Arctic zone, and this factor can hinder interaction.
– The need for a thorough review of new ship designs and analysis of specialized capabilities such as underwater surveillance equipment and defense readiness mission support.
– Inclusion of private companies, which speaks of a lack of funds in the law enforcement bodies to provide everything necessary.
Russia may be indirectly affected by the expansion of infrastructure in Alaska, which will require increased monitoring of US activities in the Arctic region.
You should also take into account the fact that American submarines are constantly in the waters of the Arctic and conduct maneuvers for strikes on Russia. However, their submarine fleet is deteriorating. They are expected to be 55 in five years’ time, up from 74 in 2010. Some of them are linked to covert carrier groups.
Translation: SM
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