Erdogan’s Foreign Policy: Balancing Relationships with the West and Non-Western Powers

We are all trying to guess what foreign policy Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will follow after his re-election towards the West and of course towards Greece. To answer this question, we need to know whether and to what extent Erdogan depends on the US and Europe to face the huge economic crisis his country is facing, Kathimerini writes.

Some seasoned analysts believe he will do everything he can to avoid Western intervention in a possible “rescue” operation for the Turkish economy because he came to power after Turkey accepted a program from the International Monetary Fund and is well aware of the political consequences. They also point to the fact that Turkey does not expect much more from its relationship with the European Union, unlike in the 2000s when expectations were very high.

But there is another factor that comes into the equation. Erdogan believes he has found strategic partners, financiers and interlocutors outside the Western camp. Qatar is offering him cash, Russia is paying him handsomely to circumvent Western sanctions, and Saudi Arabia looks set to give him a whopping $50 billion package.

This relationship has a significant advantage for Erdogan: it does not depend in any way on whether human rights are violated in Turkey, whether the rule of law prevails, etc. They don’t care. They have a very cynical and transactional relationship with Turkey and Erdogan. These relationships are not mediated by Congress or human rights organizations – no one is. Of course, none of Turkey’s partners view these relations through the prism of Greek-Turkish relations. They don’t care about that.

However, Erdogan cannot completely close the door to the West. It doesn’t suit him and he won’t do it. Ideally, he would like to secure financing from non-Western sources to overcome the financial crisis, continue the purchase of F-16s from the United States because the Turkish air force is struggling, be the main channel for circumventing sanctions against Moscow, but in at the same time to play the role of an important NATO member state.

The US and Europe will continue to make the same mistake. Fearful of losing Turkey, they will justify various behaviors even when they directly threaten the interests of the Western Alliance. Whatever anger there may be behind the scenes over Turkey’s veto of Sweden’s NATO membership or the circumvention of sanctions, ultimately the prevailing sentiment is “easy on Erdogan!” This is certainly true in Berlin, sometimes in Brussels, and certainly in the National Security Council and the State Department in Washington.

The current de-escalation of tensions with Greece seems to be continuing and it is very positive that the foreign ministry is headed by a very experienced and cautious diplomat, because the temptation for unnecessary escalation is always lurking. But let’s be realistic. Erdogan looks in the mirror and sees himself as a powerful leader of a new power, without the need to obey Washington or Europe. Pazarlak with the West, as well as Greek-Turkish relations, will go back and forth with many steps – sometimes even with crises.