To date, Hezbollah circles are keen to confirm that no presidential candidate will be imposed, despite the wishes of President Michel Aoun and Deputy Gebran Bassil. This “party” position is certainly serious, and not for maneuvering. Until further notice, the “Free Patriotic Movement” will remain the “reliable” Christian ally of the “party” in the first place.
This matter is well known to the “mainstream”, and it relies on it to hold on to its position. Because he believes that it is his right that the “party” retains its privileged position on the political map and within power, after the “current” has provided him for years and still is the Christian and patriotic cover of arms .
Rather, Bassil believes he paid the price for securing this cover as a loss of his Christian popularity and US sanctions, while other “party” allies were retreating from the facade and moving in all directions. And these people have their accounts, and have avoided “tarnishing” their image despite the alliance with the “party”.
The “current” believes that the relationship with “Hezbollah” must maintain a parallel between the two sides of the equation. Whatever the justifications, the “party” must not abandon its support for Basil in succeeding Aoun as President of the Republic. The “Arrangement of Mar Mikhael” does not end with Aoun alone, and personally, but rather signifies the “current” and his leadership, knowing that Basilio was among those who played a key role in achieving this understanding.
However, the argument that “Hezbollah” clings to is ready and strong, which is that Basil’s problem with the presidency does not primarily lie with the “party” that does not support him, but rather with the “veto” that the Americans and Arabs impose on him. And if the “party” decides to support Basil, hypothetically, this support will not open the doors for him to the presidency, but rather will intensify external “vetoes” against him.
Conversely, the existence of a disagreement between Bassil and the “party” in the presidential dossier and other issues, which Basilio can take advantage of to “exonerate himself”, even partially, from his deep bond with the “party”. And there are those who believe that the apparent divergence between the two parties could make it easier to refine the man’s image in foreign forums.
However, on the other hand, there is an impression among many that the dispute declared with Basilio does not disturb the “party”, who knows that this dispute will remain under control, but rather achieves another goal, which is to delay the completion of the presidential election dossier. Hezbollah wants to make a basket of agreements for the internal situation, and prefers to program its surveillance on regional and international transformations that can give it greater gains.
On the surface, Hezbollah appears to be caught between two impossibilities: Bassil’s inability to attain the presidency due to massive internal and external “vetoes”, and Franjieh’s arrival due to the almost complete Christian “veto” imposed on him. In the light of these two impossibilities, there are those who believe that the possibilities of the army commander, General Joseph Aoun, become the only serious ones, because the man can enjoy internal and external support at the same time, and from opposite directions.
If Hezbollah prefers this option, it is likely to take advantage of the bitter dispute between the two Maronite allies, which is upsetting the presidential elections, for the army chief to propose a compromise solution. However, the “party” may not necessarily prefer an army commander who stands at an average distance from everyone at home and abroad, rather than a close ally wholly aligned with it in strategy and tactics.
Proponents of this hypothesis say that the previous presidential vacancy, which lasted from spring 2014 until autumn 2016, allowed Hezbollah to transfer the presidency and the country from the podium of the “consensual” army commander, Michel Suleiman, to the stage of the closest ally, Michel Aoun. It is known that the relationship between the “party” and Suleiman began well, but ended in fierce disagreements.
Can Hezbollah use the current presidential vacancy to do the opposite of what it did in 2016, i.e. transfer the presidency from the hands of close ally Michel Aoun to army commander, Joseph Aoun?
Most likely, Hezbollah is not hostile to the choice of the current army commander. His officials finally expressed their appreciation for the man and the relationship with him. And if circumstances dictate that the “party” must accept the army commander, in exchange for close and long-term internal and external guarantees, then it can agree. But, of course, the preferred “party” option is one of two close allies: Bassil or Franjieh, in the sense that the circle revolves around the presidential dossier to return to the same point.
Between the two Maronite allies, it may be easier to market Franjieh on an Arab and international level. But what price will be paid to the “Lebanese forces” for providing Christian cover, or how will Basilio be convinced? On the other hand, what miracle does Bassil need to be able to polish his image among the Muslim forces in Lebanon, and among the Arabs and the Americans?
It really is a closed circuit. The path to the palace seems blocked. Only the path of emptiness and chaos remains open, until further notice.
