Shift in Focus: Discussions on the Capture of Maryinka in the Russian Information Space

In the Russian information space, the focus is shifting from the debate about the distribution of responsibility for small tactical successes in the Bakhmut region to the ongoing offensive operation to capture Maryinka, according to a report by the Institute for the Study of War.

Source: ISW report

Details: A well-known pro-war blogger associated with Wagner reportedly claimed that units of the 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions (8th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District) and the “DPR” were primarily responsible for the successes around Maryinka. According to him, the 100th brigade of the “DPR”, the “Sparta” battalion, as well as the operational-tactical groups “Kaskad” and “Rusich” also deserve responsibility for the achievements around Maryinka.

It is noted that discussions on Marinka coincide with reports of the arrival of Chechen forces that will take charge of the Donetsk front and complete the capture of Marinka and other settlements in the area.

Verbatim ISW: “These discussions are likely aimed at undermining Kadyrov’s ability to use any further tactical advances to elevate his status and re-establish his paramilitaries as the main irregular offensive force after the Wagner forces were defeated and withdrawn from the front lines. .

Many irregulars, most notably “DPR” forces, have served on the Donetsk front and may be outraged by Kadyrov’s attempt to take credit for any success after months of grueling offensive operations.

Discussions around Marinka also coincide with a coordinated attack by Chechen commanders on Wagner’s sponsor Yevgeny Prigozhin, sparking disputes between Chechen and Wagner commanders over whose forces were more successful fighting in Ukraine. Prigozhin constantly emphasized the responsibility of “Wagner” for tactical successes in Bakhmut.

Other irregulars may be trying to replicate this information campaign against Marinka and other cities in Ukraine, likely competing for favor with the Kremlin.

The capture of Bakhmut, despite providing no operational advantage, allowed the Kremlin to present to the Russian public, at least temporarily, a Russian victory.

The capture of Marinka, a pre-war population of 10,000 with no tactical or operational significance, is likely to bring the Kremlin at most a negligible informational benefit.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russian troops have advanced less than 2 kilometers from the 2014-controlled territory around Marinka, indicating that this whole conversation is premature.