As it turns out, historically, Russia’s preferred security policy has always been one of territorial expansionwrites William Lamping in the pages of the American isolationist magazine The National Interest. According to him, Ukraine has forever lost the territory captured by Russian troops. We present the material without editorial intervention.
The Ukrainian conflict has deep historical roots. Developing his previous idea that Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians are “one people” and starting from the justification of Russian aggression (demilitarization of Ukraine and protection of Donbas residents), the Russian president Vladimir Putin has been compared to Peter the Great and the conflict in Ukraine with the reconquest of the Baltic States from Sweden. In a speech on June 10, dedicated to the 350th anniversary of the birth of Peter the Great, Putin emphasized that the first Russian emperor did not take anything from Sweden, but, on the contrary, returned Russian territories. Noting that no European country had recognized Russian claims before Peter’s military campaigns, Putin said that Russia’s mission in Ukraine is to “restore and strengthen” its state sovereignty by restoring historical justice.
Putin’s recent comments are not just a comparison to Peter the Great, but a new round of Russian national strategy, which has evolved over the centuries. Beginning with the medieval prince Ivan III, Russian rulers have tried for centuries to conquer the former Kievan Rus, which is now divided between Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia. Under Peter the Great, the unification of the lands became a true imperial undertaking: he announced his plans 301 years ago after Russia’s victory in the Northern War. As recent proposals to incorporate occupied southern Ukraine and the Donbass into Russia have shown, Peter’s imperial project lives on to this day.
The unification strategy and imperial tendencies have led to the fact that the historically preferred Russian security policy has always been expressed in territorial expansion. The primitive Russian lands around Moscow were landlocked and vulnerable to attack from outside – devoid of natural barriers that could slow the enemy or aid in defense. After Ivan III declared independence in 1480, the Russian rulers gradually absorbed new lands – in the east, in the south and in the west. Expanding, Russia formed buffer zones between the borders and interior lands, trying to secure access to the sea, especially the Baltic and Black.
Today, Putin is essentially looking at the same territory that Peter the Great once looked at. Since no country disputes either Russian sovereignty over St. Petersburg or Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, Putin’s strategic focus is on Ukraine and the Black Sea. However, Putin’s original intention was thwarted by Ukraine’s military successes, and Russian forces withdrew from Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy, focusing on capturing the Donbass and the coast. Control of the Donetsk Ridge and Azov Uplands would strengthen Russia’s position between Ukrainian territory and the economic key Don River, which connects central Russia’s river network with the Black Sea, the gateway to world trade. Like Peter the Great, who captured the Azov Fortress at the mouth of the Don, Russia conquered the entire coast of the Sea of Azov and created a land corridor to the Crimea. In addition, Russian control of Kherson deprives Ukraine of access to the sea along the Dnieper River and bypasses any possible defensive line along the waterway protecting western Ukraine.
Putin as the “Time Lord”
Putin’s priority battleground in the coming months is neither Donbass nor Kherson, but European public opinion in the hope that it will favor a return to economic normality, even if it sacrifices Ukraine’s interests
–
Comparing Putin to Peter the Great sheds light on his true intentions in Ukraine. The Northern War, which began in 1700, lasted twenty-one years and began with a devastating defeat for the Russians at the Battle of Narva. Peter the Great spent eight years rebuilding the Russian army, then faced a decisive invasion by the powerful Swedish army. The Ukrainian Cossacks revolted in 1708 and united with the Swedish invaders in the hope of gaining independence from Russia. Peter’s decisive victory at Poltava over the combined Swedish-Ukrainian army turned the tide of the war in Moscow’s favor and remains one of Russia’s greatest victories. This also became the beginning of the end of the first Ukrainian state, the Hetmanship.
However, Putin’s comparison is wrong. Peter relies on allies and prioritizes building a coalition against Sweden. Today, most of Europe is united against Russia under the auspices of NATO and the European Union. Sweden itself has abandoned long-standing neutrality and is seeking NATO membership. Even after Poltava, Peter the Great fought for another twelve years: in order to finally defeat Sweden, he had to build a coalition with Denmark, Saxony, the Commonwealth, Hanover and Prussia. Today, the international coalition, on the contrary, supports Ukraine, and Russia is more like the enemy of Peter the Great, the Swedish Empire.
With his comments, Putin himself clarified Russia’s long-term intentions in Ukraine. First, Russia will continue to seek control over Ukraine and the Black Sea region. Second, even mounting losses will not prevent Moscow from continuing its advance. Third, any Ukrainian territory captured by Russian troops will most likely be lost to Kyiv irretrievably, at least for the foreseeable future. If further steps contribute to national revival and strengthen Russia’s power, the exchange of territories, or even more, their return, would be unacceptable. As long as Russia has the military means to achieve its goals, Moscow will continue to “restore and consolidate” its power in Ukraine. From Putin’s point of view, Russia’s sovereignty demands it.
