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Loyalty and Competence in Putin’s Inner Circle: The Importance of Trust and Blind Spots

President Vladimir Putin is known to keep close to him a loyal set of officials and aides. Most of his inner circle has served the Russian leader for many years.

Putin does not neglect his expectations of absolute loyalty from those closest to him. Once asked in a wide-ranging interview in 2018 whether he was capable of forgiving people when they make mistakes, Putin responded by saying, “Yes. But not everything.” When pressed by journalist Andrey Kondrashov to explain what he could not forgive, Putin’s answer was emphatic: “Treason.”

For those who have worked with the president for more than two decades, it’s no surprise that Putin values ​​and demands loyalty among his inner circle. Many of these people he has kept close since he rose through the ranks of Russia’s Soviet security service, the KGB, before becoming president in late 1999.

“Neither at home nor abroad have I seen bosses who keep disloyal people around them,” Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, told CNBC on Tuesday. “But for Vladimir Putin, loyalty alone is not enough. Three qualities are required: 1. Professionalism, 2. Efficiency, 3. Loyalty.”

Peskov, a senior Kremlin official considered a member of Putin’s inner circle, has been press secretary for 23 years. So are most of the people in Putin’s inner circle – made up of his closest ministers and confidants and often referred to as “siloviki” (or “men of power”).

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has been in office since 2004, while Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has been in office since 2012, having previously been seen as a potential leadership candidate himself.

Putin’s inner circle also includes Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, as well as the heads of Russia’s state security services, the FSB and its foreign intelligence counterpart, the SVR. There are also more ideologically influential propagandists such as Vladimir Solovyov and Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Russian Security Council.

The deputy on the council is the nationalist Dmitry Medvedev, who was also a former prime minister and president of Russia until 2012, alternating with Putin. Medvedev has always been subordinate to Putin in both roles, but he remains close to the president and is an outspoken supporter of Russia’s war on Ukraine and ideological feud with the West.

Russian analysts are not convinced that qualities such as competence and loyalty are valued equally in the Kremlin, with Russian scholar, historian and writer Sergey Medvedev noting that “loyalty has always been more important than competence” in Russia.

Russia does not look like an efficiency- and competence-oriented meritocracy,” noted Medvedev, author of “War Made in Russia” and “The Return of the Russian Leviathan.”

“It’s a very archaic and medieval — and in a way Byzantine overcomplicated system of personal loyalty, and Putin will keep anyone — even the most inefficient managers like former president (Dmitry) Medvedev, for example — as long as they show their loyalty,” Medvedev explained. on CNBC.

Russian opposition politician Vladimir Milov once worked for Putin after serving in Russia’s Energy Ministry in 2002. Disillusioned with the path Russia has taken under Putin, however, Milov now counts himself firmly with the Russian opposition. who is mostly in exile or in prison and living abroad.

Knowing Putin well, Milov said the president “100%” values ​​loyalty over competence and noted that “professionalism and efficiency are also the flip side of being able to challenge things.”

“You don’t like what’s going on? You want to make it better, and you apply your talents and determination to try to fix it, to change things. That’s not the way Putin wants it to happen. He is the only person who has the right to change or keep things right,” Milov said.

He said Putin’s demand for absolute loyalty was born of deep insecurity and fear of competition.

“That’s one of the main issues,” he told CNBC. “My personal experience of seeing him and somehow working with him is that he’s an extremely unremarkable guy. He’s the most average guy you’ll find anywhere, so he’s extremely insecure when there’s open competition or open talent , who is exposed and able to achieve better results than him.”

Milov believes that Putin is innately paranoid about a plot to overthrow him.

“But generally, if there’s a rule, it’s ‘don’t stick your head out there, because I’m going to see you as competition right away, and I destroy competition’ — that’s his approach.”

Blind spots

Attachment to loyalty can lead to blind spots, analysts note, most recently seen in the ill-fated invasion of Ukraine and the rise to power, status and influence of Yevgeny Prigozhin before his fall from grace.

When Russia first launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, analysts said it was likely that Putin had been briefed by his closest military officials that the invasion would be effortless and Ukraine would be conquered easily before to establish a pro-Russian government in Kiev.

But in the first few weeks of the war, it became clear that Ukraine was putting up much more resistance and its allies much more support for Kiev than Russia had expected.

A 40-mile-long convoy of Russian military vehicles headed toward Ukraine’s capital but halted short of its expected destination amid reports of logistical problems, including food and fuel shortages, before suffering the ignominy of retreating.

Since then, the Russian army has concentrated its manpower in the south and east of the country, occupying a swath of territory that creates a “land bridge” from mainland Russia to occupied Crimea.

Nineteen months into the war and US officials estimate that around 500,000 troops from Russia and Ukraine have been killed or wounded in the conflict so far.

During Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, as it calls its invasion, questions have been raised about the strategy and competence of the Russian military leadership. Shoigu was openly ridiculed and criticized by some military bloggers in Russia, especially those loyal to Prigozhin.

When the high-profile animosity between Prigozhin and the Ministry of Defense turned into open rebellion in the summer, however, Putin ultimately sided with his longtime and proven loyal defense minister and approved the ministry’s decree that Wagner fighters would have to sign contracts with the ministry

Kirill Shamiev, a Russian political scientist and visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told CNBC that loyalty is “a very key asset in an authoritarian environment, because you develop that trust over the years. And if a person proves his trust in a war, that’s very important for an authoritarian leader.”

The Rise and Fall of Prigogine

Prigogine was killed in a plane crash that summer, a few months after leading an ill-fated revolt against the Russian Ministry of Defense and an attempted march on Moscow.

When the rebellion was called off, Putin appeared on television vowing to punish “treason”, saying that “unreasonable interests and personal ambition lead to treason”.

After initially reaching a deal that appeared to allow Prigogine and Wagner fighters to be sent to Belarus, Prigogine and a number of Wagner’s top commanders died in a plane crash over Russia in August.

The Kremlin has strongly denied ordering Prigozhin’s death and said an investigation into the incident would be held. He called Western speculation that he ordered Prigogine’s death in revenge for his rebellion an “absolute lie”.

Prigozhin reportedly swore loyalty to Putin in a face-to-face meeting after the revolt, but analysts said his fate was sealed when he openly challenged the state and ultimately Putin himself.

“I think it was a strong message to the elite that Putin is in control,” noted Sergei Medvedev, who said the president had “meticulously waited these two months before carrying out his revenge.”

A figure like Prigogine – seen as an anomaly given his close alliance with Putin but unofficial and hostile relationship with state institutions – will not be allowed to re-emerge, they note.

“I’m almost certain that the Kremlin will never, ever again allow anyone to create the military might that Prigozhin had — or the social or political media influence that Prigozhin had,” Shamiev said.

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2023-10-06 18:04:00
#Loyalty #kind #people #Putin #close

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