Libya and Tunisia wasted three opportunities, so will they seize the fourth?

Rachid Khashana – The visit of the Tunisian delegation to Libya had an economic nature, while what is required at this stage is to establish a framework for strategic relations that will continue even after the change of governments here or there.

Despite the postponement of the visit of Tunisian Prime Minister Najla Boudin to Libya, Tunisian ministers signed several important agreements with their Libyan counterparts, at the conclusion of the visit of a Tunisian ministerial delegation to Tripoli. Libyan Prime Minister Abdel Hamid Dabaiba was waiting for his counterpart to visit Tripoli in order to visit Tunisia later, at the head of a high-level delegation, according to what he told a private Tunisian radio station. It was possible to postpone the visit of the ministerial delegation until after the Francophone summit that Tunisia is currently hosting, because the atmosphere of bilateral relations allows for agreeing on new projects and reviving old ones that were not destined to see the light. In this context, some steps were achieved through the signing of the Tunisian Minister of Trade and her Libyan counterpart of an agreement to form a joint working team to study the establishment of a joint border economic zone between the two countries in the Ras Jdir area, one of the main crossing points between Tunisia and Libya. They also agreed on the free flow of goods between the two countries, according to what the Tunisian Ministry of Economy and Trade announced on its Facebook page, without giving details. A third agreement included granting a Libyan loan to the Tunisian government worth half a billion dollars. Before that, the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya and his Tunisian counterpart signed an agreement for cooperation in common areas. The two Ministers of Trade also agreed to facilitate the entry procedures for goods of foreign origin into Libya through Tunisian ports, in addition to establishing a sea line linking the ports of the two countries.
This came within the framework of the visit made by the Tunisian ministerial delegation to Tripoli, which included the ministers of energy, mines, trade and transport and the head of the Tunisian Oil Refining Corporation (public sector). Hence, the visit of the Tunisian delegation had an economic character, while what is required at this stage, in addition to economic agreements, is to establish a framework for strategic relations that will continue even after the change of governments here or there. For example, granting Tunisia a loan worth half a billion dollars is considered an important move on the political level, which can be built upon, as it contributes to overcoming the bottleneck that Tunisia is currently experiencing. Also, the project to establish a joint border economic zone between the two countries at the Ras Ijdir crossing, if implemented, would constitute a dream dating back to the era of the late President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, but politics killed him. The strategic and security importance of this project lies in the fact that it will help the transition of about a million merchants, who are currently involved in parallel trade and cross-border smuggling, to join the umbrella of taxpayers and engage in trade under the roof of the law. Proceeding with the implementation of this project and the rest of the agreed-upon projects requires political will and determination from the two governments, which are sitting on a rocking chair, due to their unstable situations. Therefore, accelerating the establishment of the free zone will be a political achievement that enhances the interaction between the two economies, contributes to maintaining stability and security in both western Libya and southern Tunisia, and strikes smuggling networks.
In other words, the agreed-upon projects will put the two governments to a real test, because the opportunity exists today to cover a great distance in the path of economic integration and political understanding, and this is not guaranteed with the governments of tomorrow. Hence the responsibility of President Kais Saied, who brings all powers into his hands, including the presidency of the government, to seize this opportunity, so that it is not wasted as three historic opportunities were wasted in the past. This is helped by the fact that the relations between the two countries have reached a level of strength rarely reached by the relationship between two Arab countries, with more than a million Libyan visitors flocking to Tunisia annually.
Returning to recent history, we notice that relations between Tunisia and Libya witnessed periods of ebb and flow, over the course of half a century, reflected in the bickering, sometimes public, between the late presidents Habib Bourguiba and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. But pragmatism pushed the two men closer, especially when a difficult economic crisis struck Tunisia in 1969, and Libya seemed, in the early seventies, to be the only available support gateway amid unfavorable international and regional conditions, after the Arab-Israeli October War.
Against this background, Gaddafi planned to declare political unity between Tunisia and Libya, and Tunisian Foreign Minister Mohamed Al-Masmoudi arranged a private summit between the two men on the island of Djerba on January 12, 1974, which ended with the announcement of the establishment of the “Islamic Arab Republic.” However, the unified state only lasted forty-eight hours, and then it dissolved in an atmosphere filled with disagreements, which developed into the worst crisis in bilateral relations.
The motivation for this step was the despair that struck Gaddafi after the failure of Arab unity attempts, especially with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, so he headed west to Tunisia, even though he was aware of the deep divergence of visions between him and Bourguiba, on this issue in particular. However, he knew how to seduce Bourguiba, so he ceded the presidency of the unified state to him, in order to ensure his approval of the project. Bourguiba also realized the bitterness of his addressee, who had abandoned the people of the East, following the failure of the “Union of Arab Republics” project (April 17, 1971). Hence, Bourguiba’s response to Gaddafi’s unionist offer can be considered a means of distancing him from Egypt and the Levant in general, and linking him to the Maghreb train, which is inevitably disrupted. It is important to point out here that Bourguiba’s retreat from unity was not based on disparagement from the Libyans, as some suggest. On all occasions when he spoke about Libya, he mentioned the people of the country with goodness, because he did not forget the support he received from them in Sabratha, Tripoli, and Misrata. And Benghazi, when he crossed Libya secretly heading to Egypt in 1946.
However, the experiment was aborted at the hands of the deep state in Tunisia, which was against unionist calls and the Arab project in general. The cancellation of the unity led to a major deterioration in bilateral relations, including the expulsion of Tunisian workers from Libya, at a time when the unemployment rate was increasing, and the Tunisian economy needed a market the size of the Libyan market to promote industrial and agricultural products and reduce the amount of debt. Thus, the opportunity was lost to move towards integration in cumulative steps, in specific sectors, and according to mutual interests from which both parties gain together. Indeed, relations took major steps backward through mutual media campaigns based on insults and a fierce diplomatic war between the two governments.

A new setback

Following the seizure of the city of Gafsa (south) by a commando that came from Libya via Algeria in January 1980, bilateral relations deteriorated as they had never deteriorated before. Libya has become the number one enemy of Tunisian officials, and vice versa. However, the illness of Prime Minister Al-Hadi Nouira and his being forced to relinquish his position, and the naming of Mohamed Mazali as his successor, motivated the Libyans to seek reconciliation and restore broken relations. Gaddafi sent the late Foreign Minister Ali Abdel Salam Triki to Tunisia the following year, in preparation for Gaddafi himself’s visit to Tunisia. There was an opportunity for a new rapprochement that would have given impetus to bilateral relations, if things had proceeded gradually and achievable goals had been set within reasonable deadlines. In the absence of that vision, confidence was shaken again after President Bourguiba, Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid, and Mauritanian President Maaouya Ould Taya signed a treaty called the “Treaty of Brotherhood and Accord” (1983). Morocco and Libya felt that they were excluded from the treaty, and some in both countries even considered that it constituted a regional axis directed against them. They quickly reached a bilateral counter-treaty, which they called the “Oujda Treaty” in August 1984, which established the policy of axes in the Maghreb region. In that atmosphere, Tunisian-Libyan relations moved to a new stage of tension, which soon turned into a comprehensive crisis, similar to the crises of the Djerba Agreement and the Gafsa Process, which lasted about three years.
As soon as General Zine El Abidine Ben Ali took power, after the overthrow of Habib Bourguiba, Colonel Gaddafi and his ruling staff welcomed that process and rushed to reestablish bilateral relations with Tunisia. It can be said that Ben Ali and Gaddafi’s announcement of the start of joint investment in an area of ​​3,000 square kilometers in the Al-Buri offshore oil field ended one of the most prominent disputes between the two countries since the beginning of the 1980s. The Bouri field is located within the continental shelf of the two countries along the border line with Tunisia.
The agreement between the two governments to jointly invest in the field came in the wake of the decision taken by the International Court of Justice in The Hague, to which the two countries appealed. The court left to the experts of the two countries the task of drawing the boundaries of the area intended to be jointly invested.
Relations between Libya and Tunisia did not stabilize until the late President Ben Ali assumed the presidency in 1987. It was possible, after a quarter of a century of stability in bilateral relations, to find a suitable basis for establishing economic integration between the two countries, but this was not the concern of two leaders who come from the military establishment ( Gaddafi and Ben Ali). The Tunisians’ embrace of more than a million Libyan refugees in the wake of the uprising that toppled Colonel Gaddafi in 2011 showed that the popular ground was paved for greater and more comprehensive steps. However, the chaos prevailing in Libya since that date, and the absence of the state, caused the postponement of most joint projects with neighboring countries. But Libya is now beginning to recover, albeit with slow steps. The two countries can cooperate in a way that provides job opportunities for about one million Tunisians, the majority of whom live in the south, and who engage in parallel trade. In this sense, Boden’s upcoming visit to Tripoli and Dabaiba’s anticipated visit to Tunisia could be an opportunity to start a new path, one that would alleviate economic and social bottlenecks here and there, strike smuggling networks, and support the productive economy in the two countries.

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