In the long months of the most acute phase of the Covid-19 and of the lockdowns that had paralyzed economic activities and made contacts and negotiations more complicated, the European Union had to focus on priorities very different from Brexit: defining common lines to limit infections, launching joint research programs on therapies and vaccines, and above all, to adopt common measures capable of countering the most immediate effects of the pandemic on the economy and subsequently decide on a common program of aid necessary to stimulate recovery and reconstruction (Next Generation EU).
The follow-up to Brexit and the fate of the negotiations for the definition of future relations between the EU and the UK had disappeared from the agendas of the European institutions. Brexit, and relations with London, were not heard of for many months, also because in fact the negotiations, interrupted in the most serious phase of the pandemic, were then continued at a reduced pace and under track.
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has thought of it in recent days to bring the issue back to the fore in the news and in politics, with a double move that surprised and displaced the European counterpart. First he launched yet another ultimatum to European negotiators, indicating the date of October 15 as the last deadline for reaching an agreement on the future of bilateral relations after Brexit.
And as if the threat of a new ultimatum weren’t enough, a few days later his government presented a bill in Parliament (theInternal Market Bill) which contains, among others, some provisions explicitly aimed at calling into question – or rather at allowing to violate – as many provisions of the Protocol on Northern Ireland, which forms an integral part ofwithdrawal agreement, at the time solemnly signed by the British government itself and ratified by the London Parliament.
The negotiations on the future of bilateral relations were already progressing with difficulty and with many difficulties. As far as is known, the most controversial points still open concern in particular the future fishing regime in British waters and the state aid scheme.
On fishing, the EU calls for the recognition of historic fishing rights for European fishermen. London remains firm on the idea of a regime that allows the British government to grant fishing rights for European fishermen at its discretion, year after year.
And on state aid, while the EU asks to assimilate the rules in force in the United Kingdom to European ones, with the aim of defining (in return for access to the European market for British goods and services) level playing field, which makes it possible to avoid the hypothesis of unfair competition, London does not intend to undertake commitments on the subject and claims to maintain the maximum freedom of action.
Two certainly complex issues (state aid more than fishing) but probably solvable, with a minimum of goodwill on both sides.
But the framework and perspectives of the negotiation on the future of bilateral relations has now changed, and appears to be seriously compromised with the presentation of the Internal Market Bill, and the stated intention of the Johnson government to question, or violate, crucial provisions of the withdrawal agreement. An international agreement, which, it is worth remembering, had been negotiated for a long time and then signed by the British and ratified by the London Parliament, then perfected in all respects and fully in force, the violation of which would involve a very serious vulnus of fundamental principles of international law.
In London, the unexpected and surprising initiative of the Johnson executive is arousing the concerns and protests of those who see the credibility and reliability of a government dramatically compromised, which has no qualms about calling into question the contents of an international agreement. to the point that even important exponents of the Premier Party have expressed explicit reservations about the government’s initiative.
For its part, the EU could not fail to react. And so did the Commission at the highest level, threatening not only the suspension of the ongoing negotiations, but also the adoption of sanctions against London and the referral of the United Kingdom to the Court of Justice, for a sensational and fragrant violation of a commitment solemnly sanctioned in an international agreement which is itself incorporated into European law.
It is difficult at present to predict how the story will develop. It is possible that we are in the presence of yet another “bluff” by Johnson, who would have chosen to dramatize the confrontation with the EU in part to recover consensus (also in decline as a result of the disputed management of Covid) in his electorate more radically anti-European, and partly to up the ante in a very complex and difficult negotiation with the EU.
It is also possible – but less likely given the tendencies prevailing in the Conservative party – that in the examination in Westminster of the disputed bill those provisions which constitute a clear violation of the withdrawal agreement are removed, thus making it possible to resume the dialogue and of the negotiations with Brussels.
However, the observation remains that at present and, as a consequence of Johnson’s dual initiative, the road to an agreement with the EU is becoming more complicated and increasingly uphill. While the scenario of a “hard Brexit”, of a UK exit from the EU without an agreement, seems much more likely at present than a few weeks ago. And this despite the evidence – underlined by dozens of authoritative reports and analyzes from the most varied sources – that a no-deal Brexit would proportionally harm the United Kingdom much more than the EU.
If this is the outcome, all that remains is to conclude that, in the perception of the whimsical and unpredictable British Prime Minister, satisfying the requests, mainly motivated by ideological considerations, for a visible and illusory recovery of national sovereignty counts more than protecting obvious and well-demonstrated national economic interests.
A further demonstration, as if it were needed, of the damage that nationalist populism can cause when it is faced with government responsibilities.
(This post has already appeared on International Affairs)
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