ASEAN and China Face Crucial Test Over South China Sea Code
The Philippines warned China that it will not be deceived by diplomatic negotiations in the South China Sea, as Southeast Asian nations and Beijing face a year-end deadline to finalize a long-delayed code of conduct. The marathon negotiations are testing whether Beijing’s participation in monthly talks reflects a genuine desire to calm regional disputes or serves as a tactic to alter physical and military realities on disputed reefs and islands.
China and Southeast Asia Target 2026 for Final Text
Southeast Asia and China are locked in intensive monthly negotiating sessions to meet a target established by foreign ministers to produce a final text by the end of 2026. A critical milestone approaches on November 10, when leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations convene in Manila for the annual East Asia Summit, hosting Chinese President Xi Jinping. The proposed code aims to establish rules of behavior and reduce confrontations where territorial claims overlap.
China claims sovereignty over nearly 90 per cent of the South China Sea under its historical rights doctrine. This claim directly clashes with competing boundaries held by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. Official diplomatic efforts to secure a code act as the formal counterpoint to persistent maritime confrontations. The deadliest historical clash occurred in 1988, when a naval battle between Vietnamese and Chinese forces in the Spratly Islands killed 64 Vietnamese sailors.
Military Outposts And Maritime Confrontations
Modern tactics at sea involve the ramming of boats, alongside the use of water cannons, batons, flares, lasers, and sonar bursts. A Chinese fishing militia frequently swarms claimed territory to confront foreign vessels. In response, Vietnam has established its own fishing militia to contest control of local waters.
Satellite imagery reveals that China has constructed 20 outposts in the Paracel Islands and seven in the Spratly Islands, while maintaining a constant coast guard presence at Scarborough Shoal. Vietnam has built its own military facilities on 21 features in the Spratlys, including docks and a runway. These developments form part of a build-and-talk dynamic that traces back to 2002, when ASEAN and China signed a non-binding declaration on conduct.
Philippine Skepticism And The UNCLOS Dispute
Skepticism regarding the value of a deal remains high across the region. In a May speech, Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro condemned China’s diplomatic approach. Beijing subsequently barred Teodoro from visiting China, claiming his remarks undermined bilateral ties.
Teodoro stated that instead of meeting its legal obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China urges the Philippines to return to negotiations. He characterized this dynamic as a talk-and-take strategy. In the Philippine experience, Teodoro said, China used negotiations not as a path to conflict resolution, but as a means of gaining advantage. “And we will not be deceived,” he stated.
The core legal friction centers on the 2002 declaration’s foundation in UNCLOS. China pledges commitment to the law of the sea while simultaneously rejecting treaty requirements for dispute arbitration and maintaining its historical claims. When formal negotiations began in 2018, the draft document specified that it would not address or affect rights under UNCLOS.
China Seeks to Ban External Military Exercises
China also seeks to shape the content of the code by restricting external involvement. Beijing wants the code to ban ASEAN members from holding joint military exercises with countries from outside the region in the South China Sea. These provisions targeting third parties are aimed primarily at the United States and its allies.
Accepting a third-party veto would mean tacit ASEAN acceptance of China as the region’s predominant military power. Following talks with ASEAN in July, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued that the South China Sea issue should not become an obstacle in broader relations.