The recent return of Algeria’s ambassador to Niger, following a period of diplomatic strain, underscores a complex geopolitical realignment in the Sahel region, where the influence of Russia is growing alongside US efforts to re-engage with military-led governments. The move, reported by The New Arab, comes amid a broader crisis of democratic governance and rising public disillusionment with political institutions across West Africa.
Since 2020, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger have all experienced military coups, signaling a significant setback for democratic progress in the region. However, experts suggest that security concerns and elite power struggles do not fully account for the depth and persistence of public disengagement. A 2024 report by the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel highlights a strong correlation between socioeconomic conditions and political instability. Five of the ten countries with the lowest scores on the UNDP’s Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index are located in West Africa and the Sahel, reflecting deficits in access to essential services like education, healthcare, and infrastructure.
Governance data reinforces this assessment. The 2024 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) indicates that overall governance progress in Africa stalled in 2022, reversing nearly a decade of improvement. In West Africa, indicators related to democratic participation, accountability, and civic space have declined, even in countries that continue to hold elections. This disconnect between procedural democracy and tangible improvements in governance has created a legitimacy gap, fueling public dissatisfaction.
Afrobarometer surveys conducted between 2021 and mid-2023 reveal rising dissatisfaction with democratic performance across 39 African countries, coupled with an unprecedented tolerance for military intervention. This dissatisfaction is particularly acute among young people aged 18-35 in West Africa, with 69 percent expressing discontent with the functioning of democracy, compared to 59 percent among those aged 36-45. While a majority of youth (77 percent) still support elections, 69 percent report dissatisfaction with how democracy currently operates, a figure higher than older age groups.
This disillusionment stems from a perceived failure of governance systems to provide for basic needs. The capabilities approach, developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, offers a framework for understanding this dynamic. It defines inequality not simply in terms of income, but in terms of people’s substantive freedoms to live lives they value – including access to education, healthcare, security, and political participation. Traditional metrics like the Gini Coefficient and the Palma Ratio, while useful, do not fully capture the multidimensional nature of deprivation experienced by many in the region.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2024 identifies socioeconomic inequality as a key driver of democratic decline, noting that severe inequality is incompatible with effective democratic systems. Africa’s average democracy score fell to 4.04 out of 10 in the report, with Sub-Saharan Africa scoring even lower at 4.00. This decline underscores the link between inequality and political legitimacy.
Weak social protection systems exacerbate the problem. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) reports that West Africa allocates only 1 percent of GDP to social protection, the lowest proportion of any African subregion. This underinvestment leaves populations vulnerable to economic shocks, conflict, and climate change. Even during a period of apparent democratic progress between 2000 and 2020, a paper by the Africa Policy Research Institute argues that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) focused too narrowly on elections, neglecting other crucial aspects of governance such as human rights and the rule of law.
The informal economy, which accounts for an estimated 87.3 percent of total employment in West Africa in 2024, further complicates the situation. Workers in the informal sector often lack access to social insurance, health coverage, and income protection. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed these vulnerabilities, as informal workers experienced significant income losses with limited state support.
These governance failures have eroded the social contract between states and citizens, creating space for alternative sources of authority. In conflict-affected areas of northern Nigeria, central Mali, and rural Burkina Faso, non-state actors have sought to fill governance vacuums, offering basic services and protection. Research indicates that economically marginalized individuals in northern Nigeria are more likely to join violent extremist groups, while in Mali, insurgent groups are viewed by some communities as more fair and efficient than state institutions in resolving local disputes.
Afrobarometer surveys from 2021-2023 show that while support for one-party (14%) and one-man rule (15%) remains low and consistent across age groups, military rule receives the highest backing among youth (37%), exceeding that of older cohorts. This suggests that democratic decline in West Africa is driven less by a preference for authoritarianism than by disillusionment with democratic performance.
As reported by the BBC and Google News, the US is now seeking to re-engage with the military juntas in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, even as Russia seeks to expand its influence in the region. This competition for influence highlights the strategic importance of the Sahel and the potential for further instability. The situation remains unresolved, with no immediate diplomatic breakthroughs reported.
