The Perilous Pursuit of Regime Change: lessons from History
For at least a decade, the conventional wisdom has been that direct attempts at regime change by the United States have ended in disaster. And for good reason. In Afghanistan, the very same Taliban that was dislodged in 2001 returned to power in 2021 after two decades of futile U.S. efforts. In Iraq,U.S. forces succeeded in permanently ending Saddam Hussein’s regime, but the resulting human, economic, strategic, and political costs were immense. Then, in Libya, a U.S.-led NATO intervention intended to prevent the dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi from carrying out a massacre – which may or may not have materialized – led to his execution and the collapse of his regime, ultimately resulting in chaos and a failed state.
This dismal recent track record lends a surprising quality to the renewed discussion of regime change. A deeper look at the history of U.S.policies reveals both the potential and the meaningful risks involved. it’s clear that initiating regime change is far more challenging than simply calling for it. A lack of post-regime planning almost invariably leads to disaster. Crucially, Washington must differentiate between regime change as a reaction to unfolding events and as a intentional policy aimed at achieving a specific outcome.
The passage of time, coupled with flawed memories and domestic political considerations, can distort our understanding of past regime change efforts. As the Trump administration considers options for Venezuela, some observers point to the 1989 U.S. operation to oust Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega as a success story. However, this comparison is misleading. The Panama operation was far more complex and costly than often understood. (Having served on the National Security Council during the George H.W. Bush administration, I can attest to the careful consideration given to the risks and costs.) this appreciation for those risks partly informed the decision not to pursue regime change after the Gulf War in 1991 – a decision that proved prescient given the consequences of George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003.
A Change is Gonna Come
Regime change can manifest in various forms,driven by internal or external forces,or a combination of both. When externally induced,it’s often coupled with nation-building – a focused effort to establish a preferred choice. The most prosperous examples of this approach occurred after World War II, when the United States, alongside its allies, embarked on fundamental reforms in Germany and Japan. The goal was to prevent these nations from again threatening regional and global stability, and, with the onset of the Cold War, to transform them politically and economically into allies against the Soviet Union.
these efforts were remarkably successful. Both Japan and Germany evolved into robust democracies and economic powerhouses integrated into the U.S.-led Western alliance. They were eventually encouraged to develop modern militaries. this change was aided by the countries’ relatively homogeneous populations, strong organizational structures, and decisive defeats. Though, it required prolonged military occupations and extensive U.S. involvement in their political reconstruction.
Concurrently, the U.S. rejected calls for regime change in the Soviet Union, deeming it too risky in the nuclear age. Instead, diplomat George Kennan advocated for a policy of “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” cold War. The aim was to shape Soviet foreign policy, not to fundamentally transform the Soviet system itself.
Containment proved effective for four decades,ultimately contributing to the conditions that led to regime change within the Soviet Union. this “rollback” occurred less through direct Western intervention and more through indirect means – NATO solidarity and the demonstration of U.S. economic and military superiority. crucially, internal forces – the rise of nationalism and the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev – played the decisive role in ending the 70-year experiment in Soviet communism.
Numerous other regime change attempts occurred during the Cold War, often orchestrated by the CIA. The ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of cuba in 1961 stands as a stark reminder that provoking regime change can fail spectacularly, especially when the target is resolute and well-entrenched.
A Panama Parallel?
The 1989 U.S. intervention in Panama is now frequently cited as a potential model for Venezuela. At the time, the George H.W. Bush administration moved to oust Manuel Noriega, who was involved in drug smuggling and had annulled an election he lost. However,the situation was complicated by the killing of an American serviceman and concerns that Noriega would jeopardize U.S.personnel and the Panama Canal, exacerbated by Panama’s declaration of war.
Following Noriega’s capture, Washington installed the winner of the annulled election, Guillermo Endara. However, the U.S. had over 25,000 troops on the ground, a strong diplomatic and economic presence, and a long-established role in Panama due to the Canal. Moreover, Panama is significantly smaller and less populous than Venezuela. Its armed forces were weak and contained anti-Noriega factions.
Despite these advantages, regime change in Panama was not without cost. Hundreds of U.S. casualties occurred, including 23 servicemen killed. Capturing Noriega proved frustrating and challenging. The experience underscored the military difficulties of operating within another country, even a relatively kind and small one.
This experience made the Bush administration wary of similar projects. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, repeatedly emphasized that regime change was not a military mission. While the military could destroy targets or capture leaders, it couldn’t replace an entire political system. This required a comprehensive submission of all instruments of national power and a deep understanding of the target country and potential alternatives.
One Battle After Another
This caution waned after the 9/11 attacks. The CIA and U.S. armed forces, alongside Afghan tribesmen, ousted the Taliban government for refusing to hand over al-Qaeda leaders. The U.S. then played a significant role in establishing a new government, rebuilding the country, and fostering education. This was a classic nation-building exercise.
Though, the revival of the Taliban, coupled with corruption and internal divisions, undermined these efforts. After 20 years, over 2,000 American fatalities, 20,000 casualties, and trillions of dollars spent, the U.S. reversed course. The Taliban could not be defeated, and peace negotiations failed. The trump administration signed a deal to withdraw, and the Biden administration carried it out, resulting in the taliban’s return to power.
Iraq represents another cautionary tale. The George W. Bush administration overestimated the prospects for a peaceful transition to democracy in a deeply divided society. It underestimated the potential for liberators to be perceived as occupiers and made numerous strategic errors, including disbanding the Iraqi military and excluding former regime officials. nation-building proved costly, though Iraq is now a functioning democracy, unlike Afghanistan.
The 2011 intervention in Libya serves as a textbook example of the dangers of failing to plan for the aftermath of regime change. The Obama administration’s limited involvement after deposing Qaddafi left a power vacuum, resulting in a quasi-failed state. Regime change can worsen a bad situation or create new problems.
Meet the New regime, Same as the Old Regime
Following these setbacks, a period of reluctance towards regime change seemed likely. however, recent developments in Venezuela, Gaza, and Iran have placed it back on the agenda, with Cuba as a potential fourth case.
Venezuela has garnered the most attention, but the Trump administration’s approach differs significantly from the Iraq experience. There has been no large-scale troop deployment or dismantling of government structures. Instead,the focus has been on securing access to Venezuelan oil and influencing its ties with China,Cuba,Iran,and russia. while Trump has occasionally spoken of regime change, his aversion to nation-building and the potential for civil conflict suggest a more limited objective.
Gaza presents a unique challenge, with the shared goal of ending hamas’s control. Israel, with U.S. backing, has used military force, but a lack of a viable alternative political entity hinders progress. Without a plan for nation-building, a lasting resolution remains elusive.
Iran is a complex case. The 1979 revolution replaced the Shah’s secular authoritarianism with a political-clerical leadership. The Carter administration’s response was hesitant and ultimately ineffective.Today, economic hardship and U.S. sanctions fuel protests, but the regime responds with repression. while regime change might be welcomed by many, the risks of escalation and instability are significant.
Regime change as a chosen policy ought to be embraced rarely.
To Act or React
Going forward,Washington must distinguish between reacting to unfolding regime changes and proactively pursuing them.The U.S. may need to respond to internal collapses in countries like iran and Cuba, offering economic assistance and support for opposition movements. Though, deliberately pursuing regime change should be reserved for rare circumstances.
Before embarking on such a course, several questions must be answered: Is it feasible? does the U.S. have the resources and political will? Are viable alternatives available? is the U.S. prepared for a long-term commitment and potential costs? Would intervention be welcomed by the target country?
These questions are rarely answered affirmatively. Therefore, Washington should prioritize supporting transformative change within other countries when opportunities arise, acting with discipline and determination. Opportunities for positive change may be emerging in multiple regions,but success requires a nuanced and cautious approach.
