The Fractured Shield: Assessing Russia’s Intelligence Services and the War in Ukraine
The war in Ukraine has exposed deep fissures within Russia’s intelligence services (RIS) - the FSB, GRU, and SVR – revealing not just operational shortcomings, but a systemic dysfunction that is likely to persist and even intensify. While the West might anticipate a period of introspection and reform, the reality is far more complex: the FSB, in particular, is poised to increase its power despite demonstrable failures.
Throughout the conflict, the FSB has been publicly lauded in Russian media for “actions that cannot be disclosed,” a vague commendation that masks a lack of tangible success. The agency’s 16th center spearheads cyber operations against Ukraine, yet these attacks have failed to significantly shift the war’s trajectory. Despite bolstering its ranks with hackers from Russia’s criminal underworld, the “battle over bytes” has yielded no decisive victory for russian cyber capabilities.
The war will likely have the most profound impact on the FSB, but not in the form of accountability. Its core function – securing Vladimir Putin’s rule through its role as a domestic security apparatus - ensures its continued prominence within the Russian bureaucratic hierarchy. FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov, holding the rank of full General despite a non-military background, enjoys a status that surpasses even seasoned military leaders.
This pattern of avoiding repercussions for failure is deeply ingrained. The FSB historically leads investigations into major security incidents – including the 2002 Nord-Ost theater siege, the 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis, and the recent 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack - events all marked by significant intelligence and operational lapses. Instead of accepting blame, the FSB presents itself as the agency responsible for damage control, effectively shielding itself from meaningful scrutiny.
Crucially, Russia lacks a cohesive “intelligence community” comparable to that of the United States. The internal rivalries within the RIS are far more pronounced and debilitating. This fractured landscape, however, presents opportunities for Western intelligence agencies. The war has created incentives for personnel across all RIS services to consider defection, driven by disillusionment with leadership and the loss of colleagues fighting a demonstrably flawed war. Combined with the pervasive corruption within Russia, these factors create a fertile ground for espionage.
However,the West should not expect the RIS to act as a deterrent to future conflict. Instead, they are more likely to foment further aggression. Understanding the RIS’s failures is paramount, but equally crucial is anticipating how these agencies will interpret those failures - and what lessons they will (or won’t) learn. As the current war concludes, Putin may contemplate further interventions, whether in Europe, Ukraine, or elsewhere.
To effectively counter these potential actions, the US and its allies must meticulously study the RIS playbook, analyzing both their attempted operations and their dramatic shortcomings. Only through a complete understanding of these dynamics can we prepare for the next iteration of FSB, GRU, and SVR tactics designed to encourage and support future conflict.
(Disclaimer: All statements of fact,opinion,or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.)
