Will US and Russia Abandon Nuclear Restraints After New START Ends?

by Emma Walker – News Editor

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For most of us, Friday,​ February 6, ​2026, is‌ highly likely to feel no different than Thursday, February 5th. It will be a⁣ work or school day for manny of us. It might ​involve⁢ shopping for⁣ the weekend or an ‌evening get-together with friends, or ⁢any of the other ⁤mundane⁣ tasks of life. But from a ​world-past viewpoint, that day will​ represent a dramatic⁣ turning point, with ⁤far-reaching and potentially catastrophic consequences. For the first time in 54 years, the world’s two major nuclear-weapons powers, Russia and ⁤the United States, will not⁢ be bound by any ‌arms-control treaties and ​so​ will‍ be legally free ⁤to cram thier ‍nuclear⁤ arsenals with as many ⁣new warheads as thay wish⁣ — a step⁢ both sides⁢ appear poised to take.

It’s⁢ hard⁣ to imagine today, but 50​ years ago, at the height of the Cold war, the U.S. and Russia⁤ (then the Soviet Union) jointly possessed ⁤47,000 ‍nuclear warheads — enough to ⁢exterminate ‌all life on Earth ‍many times over. But as public fears of nuclear annihilation increased, especially after ⁢the near-death experiance of the 1962 Cuban⁣ Missile crisis, the leaders of those two countries negotiated a series of binding agreements intended to downsize their arsenals and ⁤reduce the risk of Armageddon.

The initial round of those negotiations, the Strategic‌ Arms Limitation ⁢Talks I, began in November 1969 and culminated‌ in the first-ever nuclear arms-limitation agreement, SALT-I,⁣ in May 1972.⁤ That would then be followed in June 1979 by SALT-II (signed⁤ by both‌ parties, though never ratified by the U.S. Senate) and two⁤ Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START ‍I⁣ and START II), in 1991 and 1993, respectively. Each ‌of those treaties ‍reduced the number of deployed nuclear⁢ warheads on U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, ⁣and long-range bombers.

In a drive to reduce those numbers even further, President Barack Obama and russian President dmitry Medvedev signed a New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty⁢ (New​ START) in April 2010, an ​agreement⁢ limiting the number of deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550 on each‌ side — still enough to exterminate all life on earth, ​but ⁤a‍ far‍ cry from the START I limit of​ 6,000 warheads per side. Originally set to expire⁢ on Feb.5, 2021, New START was ⁢ extended for another five years (as allowed by the ⁣treaty), resetting ‌that expiration date for February 5, 2026, now ​fast approaching. ​And ⁢this ‌time around, neither party‌ has demonstrated the⁣ slightest inclination to negotiate ⁣a new extension.

So, the question is: ‍What, exactly, will it mean for New START to expire⁢ for good‍ on February 5th?

Most of us haven’t given that a lot of thought in recent decades,⁤ because nuclear arsenals have, for‍ the most part, been⁤ shrinking ​and ‌the​ (apparent) threat of a nuclear war among the great powers seemed ⁤to ⁣diminish substantially. We have largely escaped the nightmarish experience —⁤ so familiar to veterans of the Cold ⁣War era —⁣ of fearing that ​the ‌latest crisis, whatever it might be, could‌ result in our being exterminated in‌ a thermonuclear holocaust.

A critical reason for our current freedom from such⁣ fears is the fact‍ that the world’s ⁢nuclear arsenals had been⁤ substantially diminished and that the two major nuclear powers ‌had agreed ⁤to legally binding measures, including mutual inspections of their arsenals, meant to reduce the ⁢danger of unintended or accidental​ nuclear war.‌ Together, those measures were ​crafted to ensure that each side ‍would​ retain an invulnerable,‌ second-strike ⁣nuclear retaliatory ⁤force, eliminating any incentive to initiate a⁤ nuclear first strike.

Regrettably, those relatively carefree days​ will come to an end⁣ at midnight on February 5th.

Beginning on February 6th, Russian and American⁤ leaders ⁢will face no barriers whatsoever to the expansion​ of‌ those arsenals or to any other steps that might increase the‍ danger ‌of a thermonuclear conflagration. And from the look of things, both⁣ intend to seize that​ prospect and​ increase​ the likelihood of Armageddon. ​Worse yet, China’s leaders,‌ pointing ⁢to a lack of restraint in Washington​ and Moscow, are now building ​up their own ⁣nuclear arsenal, only adding further ‌fuel⁣ to the urge of American and Russian leaders to ​blow well⁤ past⁣ the (soon-to-be-abandoned) New START limits.

A⁤ Future Nuclear Arms Race?

Even while adhering to those ⁢New START limits of 1,550 deployed nuclear ‍warheads, both russia and the United States had taken elaborate and costly steps to ‍enhance the⁣ destructive power of their arsenals by replacing ⁣older, ⁤less-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear bombers ‌with newer, even more capable ones. Consequently, each side was already becoming better equipped‍ to potentially inflict catastrophic damage on its opponent’s⁣ nuclear ‍retaliatory forces,​ making a first strike less inconceivable and so⁣ increasing the risk of precipitous escalation in a crisis.

The Russian Federation‍ inherited a vast nuclear arsenal from the former Soviet Union, but many of⁢ those systems had already become obsolete or unreliable. ⁢To ensure that it ​maintained an arsenal at least as⁤ potent as Washington’s, Moscow⁤ sought to⁤ replace all of the Soviet-era weapons in its inventory with ‌more modern and capable systems, a process still underway. Russia’s older⁣ SS-18 ICBMs, for ​example, are⁤ being replaced by ⁤the faster, ⁢more⁣ powerful SS-29 Sarmat, while⁣ its remaining five‍ Delta-IV class missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs) are being replaced by the more ⁢modern‍ Borei class.⁢ And newer ICBMs, SLBMs, and SSBNs are​ said to be in ⁣development.

At present, Russia possesses 333 ICBMs,approximately half of⁢ them deployed in silos ⁢and ‍the other half on road-mobile carriers. ⁣It also has 192 SLBMs on 12 missile-carrying submarines and ​possesses 67 strategic ⁣bombers, each capable of firing multiple nuclear-armed missiles.Supposedly, those systems are currently loaded with no​ more than 1,550 nuclear ‍warheads (enough, of course, to destroy several planets), as‍ mandated by the New​ START treaty. However,⁢ many of Russia’s ⁣land- and sea-based ballistic missiles are MIRVed (meaning‌ they’re capable ‌of launching multiple independently targetable reentry⁤ vehicles) but⁤ not fully ⁢loaded, ‍and so could⁢ carry additional warheads if a decision were ever made to do so. Given that ⁣Russia possesses as many as 2,600 nuclear warheads in storage,‍ it could rapidly increase⁣ the number of deployed nuclear ⁣weapons at its disposal beginning on February 6, 2026.

That Russia is keen to enhance the destructive capabilities of ​its strategic arsenal is evident ‍from moscow’s drive ⁢to augment its existing⁤ nuclear‍ weapons by developing new, longer-range ones.⁣ Those include the Poseidon, a‍ nuclear-powered, intercontinental-range,​ giant ​nuclear torpedo to be ‍carried by ⁤a⁣ new class of submarines, the Belgorod, meant to hold up to six of them. Reportedly, the‌ Poseidon is designed to detonate⁣ off ⁢the coasts of American cities, rendering them ⁣uninhabitable. ⁢Following a round of tests⁣ now underway, it⁢ is⁤ indeed scheduled to be deployed by the Russian Navy in 2027.Another ⁤new weapon, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, is being installed on some of russia’s existing SS-19 ICBMs. After being boosted⁢ into ⁢space ⁤by ‌the‌ SS-19, ⁢the Avangard should be able to travel another‍ 2,000 miles by skimming along the atmosphere’s outer surface ‍while evading most missile-tracking‌ radars.

The United States is engaged in a ⁣comparable drive to modernize its arsenal,replacing older⁤ weapons with more modern systems. Like Russia, the U.S. maintains a “triad” of nuclear delivery systems ⁤— land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched‌ SLBMs, and long-range bombers, each of which is now being upgraded with new warheads at⁣ an estimated⁣ cost over⁣ the next quarter ​century of​ approximately $1.5 trillion.

The existing New START-limited U.S. nuclear triad consists of 400 silo-based Minuteman-III ICBMs, 240 Trident-II slbms carried by ‍14 Ohio-class submarines (two of which are assumedly‍ being overhauled at any time), and 96 strategic bombers (20 ⁣B-2s and 76 B-52s) armed with‍ a variety of gravity bombs and air-launched cruise missiles.according‍ to‌ current plans, the Minuteman-IIIs will be replaced by Sentinel ICBMs, the Ohio-class SSBNs by Columbia-class ones, and the B-2s and B-52s by the new⁢ B-21 raider bomber.Each of those⁤ new systems ⁢incorporates vital features — greater accuracy, increased stealth, enhanced electronics​ — that⁢ make them even more useful as first-strike weapons, were a decision‍ ever made to use them in such a‍ fashion.

When initiated, the U.S. nuclear modernization project was ⁣expected to abide⁢ by the New START limit⁢ of 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads. After February 5th,‍ though, the U.S. will ⁢be under no legal obligation to do so.‍ It could quickly begin ​efforts to exceed​ that limit by loading all existing Minuteman-IIIs and future Sentinel missiles on MIRVed rather than single-warhead projectiles ⁣and loading the Trident missiles ‌(already mirved) with a larger number‍ of warheads, ⁣and​ also by increasing production of new B-21s. The United States has also ‍commenced development of a new ⁤delivery system,⁣ the nuclear-armed sea-launched ​cruise missile (SLCM-N), supposedly‍ intended for ​use in a “limited” regional nuclear conflict in Europe or Asia (though how such a conflagration could be prevented from igniting a global holocaust has⁣ never been explained).

In short, after the expiration of⁤ the new START agreement, neither Russia nor the United States will⁣ be obliged to limit‍ the ⁤numbers of nuclear warheads on​ their strategic delivery systems, possibly triggering a new⁢ global nuclear arms race ⁤with no boundaries in sight and an ‌ever-increasing risk​ of precipitous nuclear escalation. Whether they⁣ choose to do so will depend on the⁢ political environment in both‍ countries and their bilateral relations,‌ and also elite perceptions of China’s⁤ nuclear buildup in ⁣both Washington and ‍Moscow.

The Political Environment

Both the United States ⁤and Russia have already committed vast sums to ⁢the “modernization” ​of their nuclear delivery⁣ systems, a process that won’t be completed for ⁤years. At present, there is a reasonably broad consensus in both Washington and Moscow⁢ on the need to⁤ do‌ so. Though, any attempt⁢ to increase⁢ the speed of that process or ⁤add new nuclear capabilities will generate immense costs along with notable supply-chain challenges (at a time ‍when both⁢ countries are also trying to ramp up their production of conventional, non-nuclear arms), creating fresh political disputes and potential fissures.

Rather than ‍confront such challenges, the leaders of both​ countries may rather choose⁢ to retain the New START limits voluntarily. Indeed,​ Vladimir Putin has already‍ agreed to a one-year⁤ extension of this sort, ⁢if the United ⁣States is willing to do ‌likewise. But pressures (which are bound ‌to increase after February 5th) are also building​ to abandon those limits and begin deploying additional warheads.

In Washington, a powerful constellation of government officials, conservative pundits, weapons industry ⁣leaders, ⁢and congressional hawks is already ⁣calling for a nuclear buildup⁤ that would exceed the New START limits, claiming that a bigger arsenal is ⁢needed to deter both ​a more aggressive Russia and a more powerful China. As Pranay vaddi, a senior director⁤ of the National ⁤Security Council, put it in June 2024, “Absent a change ⁢in the trajectory​ of​ the adversary arsenal, we⁤ may ‌reach a ‌point in the coming years ​where an increase from current deployed numbers is ⁣required, and we need​ to ‍be fully prepared to execute if‍ the president ⁣makes that decision.”

Those who favor ​such a move ⁣regularly point ⁤to China’s nuclear buildup. Just a few years ago,China‌ possessed only some 200 nuclear warheads,a small fraction of the 5,000 possessed by both Russia⁤ and the U.S. Recently, however,⁣ China has expanded its arsenal ⁤to​ an estimated 600 warheads, while deploying more ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable bombers. Chinese officials ⁢claim ‍that such weaponry is needed to ensure retaliation against an‍ enemy-first strike,but their⁢ very existence ⁣is being ​cited by nuclear hawks in Washington as a sufficient reason ‍for the U.S. to ​move ​beyond the New START limits.

Russian leaders face an especially harsh quandary.At a moment when they are devoting so much of the country’s state finances ⁤and ⁣military-industrial ‌capacities ​to the war in ⁤Ukraine, they face ⁢a more formidable and possibly‌ expanded U.S.⁢ nuclear ⁢arsenal,​ not to mention the (largely unspoken) threat⁣ posed by China’s growing⁤ arsenal. Then there’s President Trump’s plan for building a “Golden​ Dome” missile shield, intended​ to ​protect the U.S. from any type of enemy projectile, including ⁣ICBMs — a system which, even if only partially successful, would threaten the credibility of Russia’s second-strike retaliatory capability.So, while ⁢Russia’s leaders would undoubtedly​ prefer⁢ to‌ avoid a costly ⁤new arms buildup,⁢ they will⁤ probably conclude⁤ that they‌ have ‌little choice​ but to undertake one if the⁤ U.S. abandons new ⁤START.

Racing to Armageddon

Many organizations, individuals, and members ​of Congress are pleading ‌with the Trump⁣ governance to accept Vladimir‍ Putin’s proposal and agree to a⁤ voluntary ‍continuation of ⁢the⁢ New START limits after⁢ February 5th.‌ Any decision to abandon those limits, ⁢they⁢ argue, would only​ add hundreds of billions of dollars to the federal budget at a time when other⁣ priorities are being squeezed. Such a decision would also undoubtedly provoke reciprocal moves by Russia and China. The result would be an uncontrolled arms race and a rising risk ⁤of nuclear annihilation.

But even if Washington and Moscow were‌ to agree to a one-year voluntary‌ extension of New START, each would be free to break out of​ it at any moment.In that sense,February 6th is likely to bring us into ⁢a new era — not unlike the early⁢ years ⁢of the Cold War — in which the ⁢major powers will be poised to ramp⁢ up their nuclear⁤ war-fighting capabilities without⁢ any formal restrictions ​whatsoever. ⁤That comfortable feeling we once enjoyed ⁤of relative freedom ‍from an imminent nuclear holocaust will also then undoubtedly ⁣begin to dissipate. If there is any ⁤hope in such a dark prognosis, it might be that such a reality could, in turn, ignite a worldwide anti-nuclear movement like the Ban the Bomb campaigns of ‍the 1960s, 1970s, and ‍1980s. If only.

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