The Party, situation and perspectives. “National security”, a broad-based insurance for the sustainability of the Party-State. – China information and news

Since 2013, the symptoms of a cult of the personality of the Chinese No.1 appear. However, the level has not yet quite reached the frenzied quasi-religious devotions inspired by Mao, or, in the USSR, by Stalin or even that of which the North Korean leaders are still the object.

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After a freeze-frame, X-ray of the Party-State membership and its recruitment, the following analysis describes how its members in fact have the exclusive tool of relations with society and its control. Under the aegis of Xi Jinping, the apparatus, the ultimate and politically impregnable expression of Chinese power, has set up – confused with a broad conception of “national security” – the conditions for its own political security.

This articulates its legitimacy not only with the effectiveness which resides in its capacity for operational mobilization of energies with a view to the renaissance project, but also to an arsenal of repressive control keeping at a distance any challenge on the pretext of “national security”.

The side effect of the unequivocal and undisputed incorporation of enthusiasms minimizes the risk of weakening the dynamics by the effect of bureaucratic seizure. At worst, it can lead to social sclerosis and stagnation of entrepreneurship and innovation. For the moment, the power keeps these deadlines at bay by stoking the nationalism of social achievements and that of technological performance, for example that of the conquest of space.

Abroad, the new stance of asserting power spurs national pride and contributes to the Party’s legitimacy despite the strategic counterfeits that have isolated China from almost all Western countries.

Party X-ray. Workforce, recruitments and loyalty.

(All figures are those of the Central Organizing Commission of the party, recently published by the Mercator Institute) which also inspired the central idea of ​​the analysis.

She speculates that, outside the electoral principle, to ensure the sustainability of its hold over the country, the apparatus bases its legitimacy not only on its socio-economic performance and the spectacular land-use planning it implements, but also by increasing at the level of a “national security” issue, “social stability”, a means of preventing social movements and critics from contesting its power [1].

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Since 2008, the number of members has increased by 21.8%, from 78 to 95 million. That is 6.7% of the total population.

Contrary to popular claims, at least over the past five years, the rate of admissions to applicants has been stable at 47%. On the other hand, the number of applicants fell sharply from 21.8 million in 2014 to 19 million in 2019, or minus 12.8%.

The admission process has become finicky and goes through several phases of control aimed at verifying the potential loyalty of candidates. After a request presented to the local cell, along with a CV, a cover letter and information on his family, his connections and his political beliefs, the candidate is contacted by two mentor-investigators who verify his information afterwards. neighbors and relations of the candidate.

After that, during a three-day course, he is invited to write a personal reflection on Marxism-Leninism and Party thought. Then, during a year of preparation, he will submit a quarterly essay on the major political issues of the day.

It is only after this period of one year that the candidate is authorized to officially apply. He presents it by being accompanied by two guarantors who serve as surety. Before being officially admitted to the oath, he will have to undergo a further year of probation.

More graduates. A stable average age at 48 years. Few women in charge.



In ten years, the number of graduates has increased from 34 to 48 million, or 50% of the members. If the number of women still accounts for nearly 28% of the members, few of them are in a position of power. In the center in blue, Sun Chunlan, aged 71. Member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau since 2012, Sun, the only woman in the top hierarchy of the regime, entered politics through the General Confederation of Trade Unions, of which she was political secretary from 2005 to 2009. In 1997, in 47 years old, she was No. 2 in Liaoning and 4 years later Party Secretary in Dalian. After that, she was No. 1 in the Fujian Party from 2009 to 2012, then No. 1 in Tianjin until 2014, when she was appointed head of the United Front. In October 2017, the 19e Congress confirmed it at 12e protocol rank of the regime.

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The socio-professional distribution has been reversed in favor of graduates and urban dwellers. If in 2009, farmers and workers still represented 39.7% (39.7 million), they are only 34.8% in 2019 (34.8 million). On the other hand, the proportion of holders of academic degrees jumped from 35.7% (34 million) to 50.7% (48 million).

While the average age of the Standing Committee is approaching 67 years, the average age of the 95 million members remains fairly stable at 48, with however a very slight tendency towards aging.

Since 2017, the majority of members aged between 35 and 60 continue to represent 46.9% of the total membership (44 million). But the proportion of those under 35 fell slightly from 24.9 to 24.2%. At the same time, the proportion of people over 60 years of age has imperceptibly increased from 28.2 to 28.9% (ie, in both cases, a variation of + or minus 1.3 million).

The proportion of women remains unchanged at 27.9% (26.5 million). Very few of them hold positions of responsibility. There is only one in the total of the 32 positions of the provincial secretariats of the Party. Only one in the political office. None in the Standing Committee.

In central and provincial government structures, only 2 women hold governor positions out of 31; in the government, only one has the rank of minister out of a total of 35 posts.

If women are still very much in the minority in the senior management bodies of the apparatus, on the other hand, the latter, already present in all public enterprises, has also set up cells in 73% of the 15.6 million private companies. .

While the control of public and private companies is almost entirely completed, nearly nine years after Xi Jinping came to power, 15 months from the 20e Congress, the time has come to examine both how the regime views its relations with society and its relations with Western democracies from which it has politically distinguished itself.

Note(s) :

[1] Note that the “democratic” references that most Western analysts put forward to criticize the Chinese regime are no longer really, since the electoral consultations are only followed by a smaller and smaller number of registered voters. The trend that provides arguments for the Chinese Communist Party weakens the idea that elected officials are the legitimate representatives of the people.


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