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Opinion – Iran’s Increasing Use of Azerbaijanis for Covert Operations

Iran Actively Recruiting Azerbaijani Diaspora for Covert Operations, Intelligence Reports Reveal

Breaking: Recent intelligence assessments indicate a sustained Iranian effort to recruit individuals of Azerbaijani descent, residing primarily in Russia and Georgia, for espionage and potential terrorist activities targeting Azerbaijan. This activity, spearheaded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, leverages both criminal networks and religious indoctrination to build a network capable of destabilizing the region.

Context: For years, tensions have simmered between Azerbaijan and Iran, fueled by differing geopolitical alignments, Iran’s support for Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and concerns over Iranian influence within Azerbaijan’s sizable minority populations. This latest reporting details a more systematic and concerning aspect of that rivalry: the active recruitment and deployment of individuals with ties to Azerbaijan, but operating outside its borders, for covert operations.

According to available evidence, Iran’s intelligence apparatus has been systematically targeting members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia and Georgia. Orkhan Asadov, identified by Azerbaijani intelligence as a key recruiter, is central to this effort. This recruitment isn’t isolated; Yunis Safarov, a Russian citizen of Azerbaijani descent, was previously linked to a 2018 assassination attempt against the former Mayor of Ganja, Azerbaijan, and was reportedly recruited by Iranian operatives while living in Qom, Iran, before joining Iran-backed Shia militias in syria.

The operation relies heavily on exploiting existing networks within the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia. The Moscow Islamic Center, established in 2012 with Iranian funding, served as a key hub. Led by Iranian citizen Saber Akbari Jiddi (reportedly a representative of Iran’s Supreme Leader in Russia) from 2013-2023, the center provided a platform for recruitment and ideological influence. Another important organization,the Huseyniyya,led by Qom-educated Russian citizen and ethnic Talish Famil Jafarov,actively defends radical Islamists arrested in Azerbaijan and maintains close ties to Akbari Jiddi.

Notably, Russia appears to tolerate, and potentially even facilitate, these Iranian activities. Moscow is known to harbor Talish separatists – an ethnic minority group with ancient ties to both Azerbaijan and Iran – who collaborate with Iran against Baku. Analysts suggest this is a purposeful strategy, as Russia prefers Iranian influence within the Azerbaijani community over direct engagement with the Republic of Azerbaijan itself, anticipating a more hostile stance towards Baku from pro-Iranian elements.

The IRGC Quds Force employs a dual-track approach to recruitment, utilizing both established crime syndicates and religiously motivated individuals. This strategy allows for flexibility and deniability in carrying out operations. The focus on the Azerbaijani communities in Georgia and Russia highlights Tehran’s deliberate targeting of diaspora populations for its regional agenda.

This escalating situation presents a significant security challenge for Azerbaijan. Experts recommend a more assertive approach, especially urging Georgia to curtail Iranian activities within its own ethnic Azerbaijani regions, given the direct threat these activities pose to Azerbaijan’s national security.The long-term implications of Iran’s recruitment efforts within the diaspora remain a critical concern for regional stability.

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