Benin is bracing for potential instability as it approaches presidential elections on April 12th, while simultaneously facing a persistent jihadist threat in its northern regions and escalating violence in the east. These challenges, outlined in a recent report by Crisis Group, come as the country navigates a complex security landscape and a contested political environment.
In northern Benin, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) continues to establish a foothold in the Alibori and Atacora departments, utilizing Pendjari and W National Parks as transit and supply routes. A large-scale JNIM attack on Beninese soldiers in April 2025 prompted a military shift towards more defensible bases, reducing attacks on those positions but potentially granting insurgents greater freedom of movement. Limited security cooperation with neighboring Niger and Burkina Faso further complicates Benin’s efforts to secure its borders, according to the report.
The potential for violence is also growing in Borgou department, where criminal and jihadist groups could exploit proximity to Nigeria’s Kainji Lake Park. Limited coordination between Benin and Nigeria on security matters raises concerns about escalating violence spilling across the border. JNIM’s potential to connect activities in southeastern Burkina Faso with a nascent presence in western Nigeria through Borgou is a key concern.
Political tensions are intensifying ahead of the presidential election. Finance Minister Romuald Wadagni, chosen by President Patrice Talon as his successor, is expected to win, but his low profile raises questions about his ability to manage a potentially divided ruling coalition. The exclusion of the main opposition party, Les Démocrates, from the election due to 2024 electoral code changes, has heightened tensions and could lead to protests. Authorities have already arrested several opposition figures, including those from Les Démocrates, in connection with a failed coup attempt in December 2025.
Further afield, Colombia is facing heightened political violence as it approaches its own elections. Threats against politicians, activists, and community leaders are expected to continue, with armed groups seeking to expand territorial control and influence election outcomes. Departments with a significant armed group presence – Chocó, Cauca, Caquetá, Putumayo, Córdoba, Antioquia, Arauca, and Norte de Santander – are particularly vulnerable. The possibility of armed groups restricting access to polling stations and intimidating voters remains a credible risk.
The relationship between Colombia and the United States could also play a role in the election’s outcome. A recent détente between President Petro and former President Trump could unravel, potentially leading the White House to attempt to influence the election through public messaging or diplomatic pressure. Such interference could strengthen Petro’s movement if We see perceived as undermining Colombia’s sovereignty.
Along the Colombia-Venezuela border, the situation is increasingly volatile. Following recent developments involving the Maduro government, the National Liberation Army (ELN) is likely to consolidate its presence in the area to maintain control of drug trafficking and smuggling routes. This could lead to increased clashes with state forces and rival groups, potentially displacing more residents.
In Ethiopia, tensions between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) remain high, raising the specter of renewed conflict in Tigray. Disagreements over the implementation of the Pretoria agreement, which ended the 2020-2022 Tigray War, and accusations of breaches by both sides, continue to fuel animosity. The potential for proxy activity, with the federal government supporting anti-TPLF insurgents and Eritrea potentially backing Fano militias, adds to the risk of escalation. Ethiopia’s upcoming elections, scheduled for no later than October 2026, further complicate the situation, as the TPLF’s registration as a political party remains unresolved.
The possibility of a direct conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea also looms large. Ethiopia’s ambition to regain access to the sea, coupled with Eritrea’s alleged support for Ethiopian opposition groups, could trigger a military confrontation. The ongoing conflict in Sudan and the widening rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates further exacerbate these tensions, with Ethiopia aligning with the UAE and Eritrea siding with Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
Finally, the truce in Gaza, established in October 2025, remains fragile. Israeli attacks, resulting in hundreds of Palestinian deaths since the truce began, are expected to continue. Dire humanitarian conditions in Gaza, coupled with Israel’s restrictions on aid deliveries, pose a significant threat to the region’s stability. The implementation of Phase 2 of the ceasefire, focused on governance and reconstruction, faces numerous challenges, including ambiguities surrounding the Board of Peace and hesitancy among international actors to commit to a stabilization force.
