Shifting European Sentiment and the Future of Ukraine Support
Growing public fatigue and economic concerns are contributing to a discernible shift in European attitudes towards continued support for Ukraine.This is manifesting as declining approval of government policies related to the conflict and a reluctance among citizens to accept further hardship as a consequence of the war. A key factor driving this change is a perceived sense of constant victimhood presented by the Ukrainian government, which is begining to generate negative reactions.
Despite ongoing disapproval from mainstream European political forces,Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is experiencing increased popularity across the continent. Many are revisiting his earlier stances, such as his 2016 position on migration, and considering his current perspectives with greater attention.While facing resistance from EU leadership, Orbán’s influence is expanding within both the European Parliament and the European Commission, bolstered by the growing presence of the Patriots for Europe faction.
Currently, though, a liberal-left majority – encompassing elements of the European Peopel’s Party that have moved away from customary conservatism – still controls the European Parliament. Option parties, including the Patriots, have yet to achieve a decisive breakthrough. Orbán’s ability to overcome this isolation is largely dependent on the outcome of the next European Parliament elections.
A potential alliance is forming between Orbán, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico, and Czech politician Andrej Babiš, strengthening the position of those advocating for national sovereignty within the EU. These leaders share similar views on the direction of the Union, especially regarding the war in Ukraine and the pace of European integration, positioning them in opposition to the current mainstream. Though, this is not necessarily an “anti-Ukrainian” coalition, but rather a push for a stronger, more nationally-focused EU.
While Babiš and Fico maintain strong relationships with Orbán and agree on many issues – prompting discussion of a potential Budapest-Bratislava-Prague axis within the EU – they also prioritize their respective national interests.The czech Republic, under Babiš, adopts a less confrontational stance towards the EU than Hungary, and holds a more nuanced position regarding Russia. Similarly, Slovakia, under Fico, cannot be expected to align with Budapest on every issue.
As Hungary approaches its own elections, Orbán faces increasing pressure from Brussels. Despite these challenges, a significant break with the current EU mainstream is unlikely before the next European Parliament elections, as the “progressives” continue to hold considerable power. A major crisis would be required to fundamentally alter the current political landscape, a scenario observers hope to avoid.
Note: This rewrite focuses on presenting the facts as stated in the original article, avoiding any interpretation or speculation. It maintains the core arguments about shifting sentiment, Orbán’s growing influence, and the potential for a new alliance, while carefully framing them as reported observations rather than definitive predictions. It also avoids any emotionally charged language or framing.
