Bakhmut

Thus, the “Wagnerites” have long announced plans to surround Bakhmut and trap the forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but the rebuff and active defense of the Ukrainian defenders did not allow them to do this.

Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War previously estimated that Russian forces were unlikely to be able to encircle Bakhmut after the invaders made several quick breakthroughs to the north, south and east of the city in the winter-spring of 2023.

Prigozhin likely expected Ukrainian troops to withdraw completely from Bakhmut out of fear of imminent encirclement, and even offered to allow President Volodymyr Zelensky to withdraw Ukrainian troops from the city on March 3rd.

However, the Ukrainian Defense Forces continued to protect ground communications west of Bakhmut, which forced the Wagnerites to fight in urban areas and make their way right through the city itself.

Prigozhin’s confession also confirms statements by Ukrainian officials that the “Wagnerites” are losing initiative on the battlefield.

Bloggers linked to Prigozhin and his mercenaries blame Russian regular troops for military failures in and around Bakhmut.

Prigozhin directly appealed to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation General Valery Gerasimov with a request to keep Sacco and Vanzetti for at least a few more days. “Putin’s Cook” also accused Gerasimov of retreating Russian troops from the flanks of Bakhmut ..

A Russian blogger associated with the Wagner PMC said on May 18 that Russian forces lack the organization, fire support, coordination and training needed to protect Bakhmut’s flanks. Voenkor claimed that Russian airborne troops were trying to occupy territory in the “gray zone”, and Ukrainian forces immediately stopped their actions with artillery fire, depriving the occupiers of the opportunity to move and gain a foothold in the intended place.

ISW notes that Prigozhin’s attempts to blame the Russian military for the failures around Bakhmut are forcing some ultranationalists in the Russian Federation to accuse him of using the battle for the city to satisfy their personal ambitions.

Earlier, analysts assessed that “Russian leaders (siloviki)” are trying to discredit Prigozhin, accusing him of trying to use the victory in Bakhmut to promote their political aspirations in the Russian Federation.

Key Findings

• Ukrainian forces seized the tactical initiative and achieved tactically significant successes in the Bakhmut area in counterattacks on 18 May.
• Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces had seized the initiative on the battlefield near Bakhmut.
• On the night of May 17-18, Russian troops launched another large-scale missile attack on the territory of Ukraine, for the ninth time since the beginning of May on Kyiv.
• The Kremlin continues to escalate internal repressive measures that are likely to encourage self-censorship and prepare Russian society for a protracted war.
• NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that NATO could discuss the possibility of providing Ukraine with Western fighters at the June meeting of defense ministers.
• Russian troops carried out limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and at the Svatovo-Kremennaya line.
• Russian forces carried out limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk line.
• Unknowns, possibly Ukrainian partisans, attacked a Russian railroad in occupied Crimea.
• On May 18, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ruled that Russian military personnel who voluntarily surrendered on the battlefield would be prosecuted on charges of treason.
• The Russian occupation “authorities” continue to announce patronage programs with the constituent entities of the Russian Federation to support infrastructure projects in the occupied territories.