Russia Restructures Intelligence Services to Support Ukraine War and Global Sabotage

FSB Expansion and Domestic Control

The FSB has expanded its authority to function as the primary instrument of wartime control within Russia. The agency now possesses the power to suspend internet and telecommunications services, access private databases without court orders, and approve international scientific cooperation, according to ICDS. The agency also reasserted full control over pretrial detention facilities.

Abroad, the FSB’s Fifth Service has shifted its focus after losing political intelligence opportunities in Ukraine. The service now manages occupation administrations in Ukrainian territories and conducts active measures across Europe to disrupt military aid to Kyiv. Simultaneously, the FSB’s Second Service has intensified efforts to discredit and penetrate Russian dissident communities living outside the country.

GRU Sabotage and the 795 Centre

Russia’s military intelligence, the GRU, has activated wartime functions including psychological operations, sanctions evasion, and sabotage. ICDS reports that GRU sabotage campaigns in Europe frequently employ “disposable assets,” such as petty criminals and low-level recruits often sourced through social media.

To manage high-stakes overseas operations, the Kremlin has established two distinct entities. The GRU elevated Unit 29155 to the Directorate of Special Activities (SSD). Separately, Vladimir Putin established Centre 795, an autonomous service reporting directly to the Chief of the General Staff. This center is dedicated to abductions and political assassinations of perceived traitors and defectors abroad, according to ICDS and Prezi.

SVR Pivot to the Global South

The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has redirected resources toward the “Global South” to offset losses in the West. The SVR has absorbed elements of the political technology networks previously run by Yevgeny Prigozhin in Africa, where Moscow frames itself as a defender of traditional values and an anti-colonial force, ICDS reports.

Russia is also utilizing non-traditional channels to bypass formal diplomatic barriers. Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s Envoy for Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation, uses backchannels to seek direct access to the White House, bypassing the U.S. intelligence community and foreign policy establishment. The Presidential Executive Office has also expanded influence operations to cultivate "fellow travellers" in Europe and the Global South.

Purges Within the Ministry of Defence

The FSB’s Department of Military Counterintelligence (DVKR) has been utilized as a political tool to purge high-ranking officials within the Defence Ministry. ICDS and Prezi report that the DVKR has been used to dismantle patronage networks, specifically targeting allies of former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu.

Despite these purges, the DVKR has failed to prevent several high-profile assassinations of Russian military generals. This failure has led to internal blame-shifting and heightened tensions between Russia’s various security agencies.

Operational Adaptation and Vulnerabilities

To maintain operational capacity, Russian intelligence is increasingly exploiting lax civil registration systems in countries like Brazil to appropriate identities for deep-cover agents. The services are also using "cultural diplomacy" and scientific exchanges as covers for intelligence gathering, according to Prezi.

While interagency coordination between the FSB, SVR, and GRU has shown signs of improvement, ICDS and Prezi report that the system remains hindered by systemic corruption, nepotism, and a corporate culture that prioritizes patronage over meritocracy.