The Weight of Underestimation: Cheney, Iraq, and the Search for Reality
The aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq revealed a stark truth: the United States had underestimated the challenges ahead. For vice President Dick Cheney, this realization spurred a steadfast effort to align policy with the evolving reality on the ground. His focus shifted from justifying the initial decision to invade, to confronting the burgeoning complexities of a post-Saddam Iraq.
This shift manifested in a crucial briefing for President BushS National Security Council (NSC) just before Veterans Day in 2003.Facilitated by Cheney, the briefing was led by a CIA team tasked with presenting a clear assessment of the situation. Recognizing the potential for intense scrutiny, the lead analyst initially designated for the presentation proactively chose to send two senior experts – a highly regarded military specialist and a seasoned political analyst – who possessed a deep understanding of the intricacies of the situation.
The briefing proved pivotal. A CIA military analyst, a PhD and former Marine, directly challenged Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld’s attempts to downplay the emergence of an insurgency. Rumsfeld argued that the term “insurgency” was ill-defined and therefore inaccurate. The analyst, with calm precision, presented the two moast widely accepted definitions of insurgency, demonstrating that the CIA’s assessment aligned with the definition utilized by Rumsfeld’s own Department of Defense. He meticulously laid out the underlying premises supporting this conclusion, making the evidence undeniable for those present. President Bush ultimately acknowledged the reality of the developing insurgency, instructing NSC members to maintain internal consistency on the issue and to avoid using the term “insurgency” publicly.
This episode offers a revealing insight into Cheney’s unwavering conviction regarding the necessity of the Iraq War, and his subsequent acceptance of controversial methods. Following a Presidential Daily Briefing, Cheney recounted his experiences as Secretary of Defense during the Gulf War. He vividly recalled data gleaned from Hussein Kamel,Saddam hussein’s son-in-law,who briefly defected. Kamel’s revelations indicated that Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme was more advanced than previously assessed. Cheney didn’t present this as a critique of past CIA analysis, but rather as a demonstration of the high stakes involved. He understood the weight of his role in persuading President Bush to invade Iraq, believing he had acted on sound reasoning. His fear was that underestimating Saddam’s WMD capabilities again, and allowing access to those weapons for Osama bin Laden, would have catastrophic consequences for the United States.
As the Economist noted in Cheney’s recent obituary,he remained resolute in his convictions despite criticism surrounding his approach to counterterrorism and the intelligence failures regarding WMDs in iraq. The magazine concluded that, “He was unmoved… He was, as always, just doing his job. Trying to protect America.”
Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
