Two weeks ago, incumbent Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani announced his withdrawal from the premiership race. Amid political negotiations following the November elections, this move effectively paved the way for former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to return to power.
This growth is not just an act of political recycling; it reflects the failure of Iraqi state-building after the United States invasion of 2003. Under al-Maliki, Iraq may well go back to the disastrous policies that in 2014 led to the rise of ISIL (ISIS).
Sectarian politics
In reflecting on what al-Maliki’s return could possibly mean for Iraq, it is indeed crucial to examine his track record.In 2006,when he was first nominated for the prime minister’s post,the management of US President George W Bush supported him. Washington did so in the name of stability and trust, despite the early red flags. By November 2006,just six months after al-Maliki came to power,US National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley was already raising concerns about his ability to rein in violence against the Sunni population.
The decision by the Bush administration to continue its support for the prime minister reflects its own record of misguided policies,driven by ignorance of the region and its history. By backing al-Maliki, Washington paved the way for the chaos and instability it sought to avert.
During his first two terms, al-Maliki established a governance template that deliberately dismantled the post-2003 settlement’s vision of inclusive politics. He pursued policies of purposeful exclusion of the Sunni population on the political and social levels under the guise of de-Baathification. while originally intended to remove Saddam Hussein’s loyalists, the process was weaponised by al-Maliki as a sectarian tool. In 2010, for example, the prime minister used a de-Baathification law to ban nine parties and more than 450 candidates — predominantly Sunnis — from the parliamentary elections.
The security apparatus under his leadership also carried out arrests of moderate Sunni politicians on trumped-up charges of “terrorism” and suppressed peaceful demonstrations.
The 2013 massacre in the town of al-Hawija, in Kirkuk province, is a case in point. In january of that year, scores of Sunnis gathered for a peaceful protest of the discriminatory policies of al-Maliki’s government that lasted weeks. Three months later, security forces attacked the protest sit-in, killing at least 44 protesters.
Under al-Maliki, Baghdad also witnessed the deliberate displacement of Sunnis from their homes and the consolidation of shia-dominated areas. This was a form of demographic engineering with the full support and complicity of the state.
Consequently of these policies, sectarian politics escalated to the point were ethnic and religious identity became the main dividers of society, undermining national unity and plunging the country into civil conflict.
The constant assault on Sunni communities generated widespread discontent, which was easily exploited by extremist organisations – first al-Qaeda and then ISIL (ISIS).
Corruption and mismanagement
The industrial-scale haemorrhaging of national wealth during the al-Maliki era was
