In August 1964, Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon formally objected to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, calling it a “predated declaration of war” and an “evasion of congressional responsibility.” His dissent, largely lost in the immediate aftermath of the vote, underscored a decades-long concern about the erosion of Congress’s constitutional authority to declare war, a power vested in the legislative branch by Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.
Morse’s opposition stemmed from a deep-seated belief that the executive branch was increasingly circumventing Congress in matters of war and peace. He had warned colleagues that allowing the President unchecked power to initiate military action would lead to a dangerous precedent, stating that “the American people will quickly lose their liberty if you do not stop feeding the trend toward Government by executive supremacy.”
The roots of Morse’s skepticism extended back to the post-World War II era and the burgeoning Cold War. A progressive Republican turned Democrat in 1955, Morse initially supported a strong stance against Soviet expansionism but grew increasingly wary of what he perceived as executive overreach in foreign policy. He publicly criticized the Central Intelligence Agency after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1962, describing it as “an unchecked executive power that ought to be brought to an end.” He also predicted that Congress would likely no longer formally declare war before engaging in military conflict.
His concerns weren’t isolated. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, delegates explicitly debated the power to declare war. When Pierce Butler of South Carolina suggested granting that authority to the President, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts countered that such a power was incompatible with a republic. Alexander Hamilton, writing in Federalist No. 75, argued against vesting this power in a single magistrate, stating that the nation’s interests were too “delicate and momentous” to be left to the “sole disposal” of the President. Abraham Lincoln, during his time in Congress, echoed this sentiment, warning against allowing the President to initiate war at will, likening it to the oppressive practices of kings.
Morse’s objections to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution were not merely procedural. He argued that the resolution functioned as a de-facto amendment to the Constitution, effectively transferring the power to declare war from Congress to the President. He had previously challenged President Eisenhower in 1957, unsuccessfully objecting to a resolution seeking pre-authorization for military action in the Middle East, deeming it “constitutionally dangerous.”
Even before the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Morse had earned the nickname “the Five O’Clock Shadow” for his habit of delivering lengthy speeches on the Senate floor, often to an empty chamber, opposing unauthorized military interventions. Notably, in the week before John F. Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, Kennedy reportedly told Morse, “Wayne, I want you to know you’re absolutely right in your criticism of my Vietnam policy.” Later, when President Johnson sought a military appropriation for Vietnam in the spring of 1964, Morse accused him of attempting to secure congressional approval for “illegal, unilateral military action” without requesting a formal declaration of war.
In 1965, following Johnson’s decision to escalate the war in Vietnam with bombing campaigns and the deployment of 50,000 troops – a move the President himself described as “really war” – Morse became a prominent voice in the growing antiwar movement, continuing to advocate for congressional oversight of military actions. The debate over the constitutional balance of power between the executive and legislative branches regarding war remains a central issue in American foreign policy.
