Xi Jinping manages Taiwan dynamics ahead of 2028 elections

Shifting Strategies and the Calculus in Beijing

For nearly a year, Beijing has refrained from the massive military drills that previously defined its coercive strategy toward Taiwan. Chinese fighter jets still cross the centerline and warships operate to the east, but the absence of large-scale military signaling points to a calculated pivot under Chinese leader Xi Jinping. This shift stems from growing confidence in Beijing that the current geopolitical environment favors its long-term objectives without requiring an immediate, high-risk military intervention.

That strategic outlook was reinforced following a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in May. Remarks made by Trump after that summit generated uncertainty regarding Taipei’s confidence in unwavering American military backing. “I’m not looking to have somebody go independent,” Trump stated at the time, adding, “And, you know, we’re supposed to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war. I’m not looking for that.” Those public reservations resonated deeply across the strait, giving Beijing room to pursue a strategy centered on political maneuvering rather than lethal force.

For years, many in Washington and across the Asia-Pacific region pointed to 2027 as a critical pivot point for Beijing. Xi Jinping had previously directed the People’s Liberation Army to be prepared for a cross-strait military confrontation by that year. Yet, as 2027 approaches, it appears exceedingly unlikely that Xi is preparing to deploy lethal force in the immediate term. In fact, Xi’s willingness to execute systematic purges of his military high command indicates a ruler confident enough in his internal controls that he does not fear an imminent cross-strait war.

The 2028 Political Horizon and the KMT Factor

Rather than 2027—the year Xi is expected to begin his fourth term—the true test for the region now lies in 2028. That year will feature presidential elections in both the United States and Taiwan, events that will establish the long-term trajectory of cross-strait relations. Xi remains firmly committed to organizing his forces for a potential conflict over the long haul, but his primary ambition continues to be the political annexation of Taiwan, not a catastrophic military invasion.

Beijing’s current optimism rests heavily on the hope that the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party will recapture power in 2028. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has held power in Taipei since 2016, a twelve-year stretch during which Beijing severed visible government-to-government engagement, routinely denouncing the DPP as separatist. By contrast, Xi established a major historical precedent in 2015 by shaking hands with his Taiwanese counterpart, an achievement he is eager to replicate under a more sympathetic administration.

Those hopes received a significant boost in November 2025, when Cheng Li-wun unexpectedly assumed the role of KMT chair. Cheng has consistently championed a softer diplomatic approach toward Beijing, highlighting shared cultural identities and the necessity of direct cross-strait dialogue. Demonstrating the shifting political tides, Cheng traveled to Beijing in April 2026 for a meeting with Xi, occurring just weeks before Xi’s summit with President Trump in Washington.

Washington’s Policy Window and the Arms Sales Dilemma

The intervening two years represent a vital window for Washington and Taipei to reinforce their partnership ahead of what is widely expected to be a turbulent post-2028 environment. Taiwan has actively reshaped its economic and security posture, pivoting its trade away from the Chinese mainland toward the United States while boosting domestic defense spending to serve as a reliable security partner.

To solidify this deterrence, the U.S. administration faces an immediate decision regarding a pending $14 billion arms package currently sitting on the president’s desk. Even if the administration chooses to divide the sale into smaller tranches to temper immediate friction with Beijing, approving the transfer is essential. Historically, Beijing reacts far more intensely to high-profile political gestures, such as official visits, than to the routine bureaucratic mechanics of military procurement.

Failing to move forward with these weapons transfers carries profound long-term risks. Halting or indefinitely delaying the package effectively grants Beijing a veto over American foreign policy and arms sales, subtly altering the cross-strait balance of power. As an aging leadership in Beijing contemplates its timeline, any perception of prolonged hesitation in Washington only accelerates the pressure for a more aggressive regional stance after the 2028 electoral cycle concludes.