The Weight of Underestimation:โฃ Cheney, Iraq, and the Search โขfor Reality
The aftermathโค of the 2003 invasion of Iraq revealed โฃa stark truth: theโ United States had underestimated the challenges ahead. For vice President Dick Cheney, this realization spurred โคaโ steadfast effort to align policy with the evolving reality on the ground. His focus shifted from justifying the initial decision to โinvade, โto confronting theโข burgeoning complexities of a post-Saddamโฃ Iraq.
This shift manifested in a crucial briefingโข for President BushS National โSecurity Council (NSC) just โฃbefore Veterans Day in 2003.Facilitated by Cheney, the briefing was led by a CIA team tasked with presenting a clear assessment โof the situation. Recognizing the potential forโค intense scrutiny, the lead analyst initially designated for the โpresentation proactively chose toโ send two senior โฃexperts – a highlyโข regarded military specialist โคandโ a seasoned political analyst – who possessed a deepโข understanding of the intricacies of the โฃsituation.
The briefing โproved โฃpivotal. A CIA military analyst, a PhD and former โMarine, directly โขchallengedโค Secretary โof Defense Don Rumsfeld’s attempts to downplayโ the emergence of anโค insurgency. โRumsfeld argued that the term “insurgency” was โill-defined and therefore inaccurate. The analyst, with calm precision, presented the โtwo moast widely accepted definitions of insurgency, demonstrating that the CIA’s โassessment aligned with the definition โutilized by Rumsfeld’s own Department of Defense. He meticulously laid โคout the underlying premises โsupporting this conclusion,โข making the evidence undeniable for those present. President Bush ultimately acknowledged the reality of the developing insurgency, instructing NSC members to maintain internal consistency on the issue and to avoid using the term “insurgency” publicly.
This episode offers a โrevealing insight into Cheney’sโข unwavering conviction regarding the necessity โof the Iraq War, โand โhis subsequent acceptanceโ of controversial methods.โค Following a Presidential Daily Briefing, Cheney recounted his experiences as Secretary of Defense during the Gulf War.โ He vividly recalledโฃ data โฃgleaned from Hussein Kamel,Saddam hussein’s son-in-law,who briefly defected. Kamel’s revelations indicated that Iraq’sโ nuclear weapons programmeโข was more advanced than previously assessed. Cheney didn’t present this as a critique of past CIA analysis, but rather as a demonstration ofโ the high stakes involved. He understood the weight of his roleโฃ in persuading President Bush to invade Iraq, believing he had acted โonโฃ sound reasoning. โฃ His fear was that underestimating Saddam’s WMDโ capabilities again, โand allowing access to those weapons for Osama โคbin Laden, โwould have catastrophicโค consequences for the United States.
As theโ Economist notedโฃ in Cheney’s recent obituary,he remained resolute in his convictions despite criticism surrounding his approach to โcounterterrorism and theโ intelligence failures regarding WMDs in iraq. The magazine concluded that, “He was unmovedโฆ Heโ was, asโข always, just doingโ his job. Trying to protect America.”
Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions โคorโ views ofโค theโ USโ Government. โNothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or โคendorsement of โthe author’s views.
