New Democracy

Playing steadily unopposed on the governability issue for the past five years, the ND and the Kyriakos Mitsotakis they mainly had to deal with their (public) selves, with the corresponding fluctuations in their percentages depending mainly on the occasion.

In all the major crises so far (wiretapping, the Tempe accident, the investigation into the accident, the vote on same-sex marriage), the peculiar political phenomenon of the period was present: The percentages of the government were falling, but without any of the opposition parties benefiting from this, with the only recent exception is the strengthening of the far-right parties.

Historically, the government’s biggest poll slips came immediately after the Tempe crash, in the March 2023 polls, and more recently, exactly one year later, due to a combination of factors such as obstruction of the crash investigation, dissatisfaction with the political handling of the marriage of same-sex couples and the continued accuracy.

There had been a smaller-scale dip in the polls due to the wiretapping scandal, but even then the discontent with the government did not benefit the opposition.

It covers the losses

During these periods of polling weakness, the ND’s percentages in the intention to vote had shown a retreat of the order of four points between February and March 2023 (from the sphere of 30% to the levels of 26%) and a decrease of a corresponding extent between February and March 2024 (from 28.5% to 24.6%, based on Metron Analysis surveys, but with the trend appearing similarly in all other polls).

Today the government is in a similar position and appears to be covering the losses of the previous months as the date of the polls approaches, with its percentages after reductions approaching the threshold of 33%, which the Prime Minister set in the previous days as a measure of success in the European elections of June 9.

Communicating (and non-communicating) containers

The political and polling phenomenon of recent years now has an element of peculiar regularity. At times the government retreats, the opposition remains stagnant, and the main changes are observed in the ups and downs of the percentages between ND and the so-called “grey zone” and between SYRIZA – PaSoK, without implying direct movements.

According to pollsters and government policymakers who analyze and evaluate public opinion polls, the key to all polls over the past five years to date has been movements and “returns” to and from the undecided vote pool. .

This is where the leakages from the government’s percentages are mainly located, for whatever reason, the extreme right seems to derive some momentum from there (and to a lesser extent through direct movements from the ND).

At the same time and with the stagnation of PaSoK established, the recovery of SYRIZA seems to be partly based on some initially disappointed, who “resorted” to the gray zone and mainly on the activation of the public, which did not participate in political and electoral activity the past years.

The unclear vote

The period of the government’s largest poll decline, by almost five points in early 2024, coincided with the largest increase in the undecided vote, which had reached levels of 15%.

The figures to which political and poll analysts drew attention at that time were:

a) At a research level, the European elections, especially as they are far from the national polls and are not accompanied by any serious political stakes, present a peculiarity: Methodologically, it is not safe in this case to reduce the percentages of undecideds for the reliable estimation of the result.

b) That with the political atmosphere of recent years and the absence of alternative and credible proposals for governance, it is difficult to assess and analyze from a political point of view whether and to what extent the shift to unspecified voting is a conscious and definitive choice, which shows more the tendency to distance , either through abstention or through the so-called “hidden vote” which is not manifested in polls.

Primarily, it seems that Kyriakos Mitsotakis has invested in these two elements from a strategic and tactical point of view in the last months and after the “bells” of the big polling decline between February and March rang.

The nature of the election campaign has changed, the Prime Minister himself has emphatically raised political dilemmas, promoting political stability (or rather the threat of instability) and, fearing a by definition loose vote, is clearly attempting to turn the European elections into a process of special of national importance.

The identity of the undecided

With the new data, the common component of the investigations of the period seems to be formed based on the following elements. ND shows a recovery trend, with its percentages reaching over 30% and realistically expecting to reach 33%, which Kyriakos Mitsotakis seeks. At the same time, the “grey zone” is formed at 10% and SYRIZA appears to be moving towards the levels of its national percentage and to secure second place, while PaSoK also stabilizes in its national percentages, but in third place.

The crucial elements in terms of verifying this poll image are for the ND whether it will continue to repatriate disaffected people from the pool of undecided votes in the one month period until the European elections, and for SYRIZA whether and to what extent the poll stability will translate and in voting, given that the public to which it is clearly addressed is now characterized by a rather apolitical attitude and with a stronger tendency to abstain from elections.

As for PaSoK, and with the job case defined by poll numbers, the question is whether he has the time or the means to close a polling gap of four to five points in a few weeks.

The interesting element of the period is that researchers’ attention is focused on the political composition and party identity of the pool of undecideds. It seems that these are mainly centrists and centre-lefts, who have by and large voted ND in the past. This finding leads to the well-founded assessment that the electoral stakes and the achievement of political goals in the upcoming European elections will once again be decided in the Center. The peculiarity, however, is found in the fact that the bets of the government and not of the rest are basically judged there.