Russia Is Waging War on Europe. Let’s Stop Calling It ‘Hybrid.
According to reporting from TVV World, CNN, The Economist, The Conversation, Ukrinform, The Guardian, and Politico, the ongoing campaign orchestrated by Moscow has far surpassed the threshold of conventional “hybrid” warfare, forcing governments to reevaluate their defensive strategies and direct responses.
The Linguistic Trap of Hybrid Warfare
For over a decade, European capitals and NATO headquarters have relied on terms like “hybrid threats” or “hybrid warfare” to categorize hostile acts that remain just below the threshold of formally declared war. According to the European Commission, the term encompasses a mixture of coercive, subversive, conventional, and unconventional methods used by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives. Originally credited to a 2007 paper by former Pentagon analyst Frank Hoffman, this framing allowed institutions to avoid triggering mutual defense pacts or provoking catastrophic economic ramifications.
Yet, critics argue that maintaining this vocabulary has lulled the public into a dangerous sense of complacency. James Appathurai, NATO deputy assistant secretary-general for innovation, hybrid, and cyber, noted to Politico that the alliance is well past mere threats given the sheer range of ongoing cyber attacks, sabotage operations, and airspace violations. The designation allows governments to sidestep a formal state of conflict, but it increasingly obscures the reality of sustained, targeted aggression against civilian and military infrastructure across the continent.
Escalating Sabotage and Asymmetric Tactics
The operational profile of these attacks has shifted dramatically. Rather than relying exclusively on professional operatives dispatched from Moscow, Russian intelligence services now orchestrate actions remotely. According to The Guardian, saboteurs are recruited via platforms like Telegram and paid in cryptocurrency to execute specific, disruptive tasks. This methodology allows handlers to maintain plausible deniability while sowing chaos inside European borders.
The physical toll on European logistics and defense manufacturing continues to mount. In July 2024, an incendiary parcel burst into flames at a DHL hub in Leipzig, Germany—an incident tied months later to the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency. More recently, authorities discovered an explosives-laden drone next to a Ukrainian cargo plane at Leipzig airport. Poland has faced parallel sabotage attempts, while unexplained explosions and fires have hit defense facilities supplying Ukraine across multiple jurisdictions.
Denmark issued warnings regarding Moscow recruiting Danish citizens to target defense companies with ties to Ukraine. Meanwhile, maritime choke points remain vulnerable. British armed forces intercepted a Russian shadow fleet vessel in the Channel, and Norwegian authorities seized a Russian vessel in the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard at Ukraine’s request.
Institutional Constraints and the Push for Expanded Powers
European governments face severe structural limitations when formulating a response. Unlike central intelligence apparatuses with broad external mandates, many European security services are primarily tasked with domestic intelligence collection, leaving officials with a narrow toolkit restricted to diplomatic expulsions and economic sanctions.
In response to these operational gaps, several European Union states, including the Netherlands, have introduced legislative bills aimed at drastically expanding the surveillance and operational powers of domestic intelligence agencies. Berlin’s reaction to the Leipzig airport drone incident involved closing a Russian cultural center and consulate, prompting measured retaliation from Moscow rather than outright military escalation.
Czech security experts argue that the European Union should have established a unified counter-threat mechanism as early as 2014, following initial territorial incursions in Ukraine.
The Cost of Inaction
As governments weigh how to impose meaningful costs on Moscow without triggering a wider war, the debate over terminology remains secondary to the physical reality on the ground. Every intercepted shadow vessel and neutralized explosive device demonstrates that the conflict is not a distant geopolitical abstraction, but an active campaign waged within European borders.
When a nation’s logistical hubs, airspace, and critical supply chains become regular targets for foreign intelligence operations, refusing to name the conflict for what it is ceases to be diplomatic caution—it becomes an invitation for more.