Italian Court of Cassation Rules on Motivation in Indictment Decrees Following Cartabia Reform
“A provisional sentence of anticipated conviction” — that is how the defense in a bankruptcy case described the indictment decree it challenged, and on review this year Italy’s Court of Cassation refused to strike the motivation attached to it, Altalex reported.
The ruling, Cass. pen., Sez. VI, n. 38667/2026, settles a question that has followed every prosecution filed since the Cartabia reform took effect: when the judge at the preliminary hearing orders a defendant to stand trial under Article 425(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure — the new “reasonable forecast of conviction” standard — may the decree explain why, or does any written reasoning turn the document into a prejudicial verdict in disguise?
The Sixth Section’s answer: the motivation stays, and a defendant’s remedy is not an appeal for structural abuse of power but a targeted request to strip the offending passages, a tool the court says now has a statutory home in Article 115-bis of the Code.
The defense’s constitutional attack
The case reached the Supreme Court after a preliminary hearing judge ordered a man to stand trial on bankruptcy offenses. His lawyer challenged the decree at Cassation, arguing the reasoning attached to it was structurally abusive because it altered the nature of an act that, under the reformed Article 425(3), must rest on a “reasonable forecast of conviction,” Altalex reported.
That standard replaced the old test of whether the accusation was “sustainable at trial,” a criterion governed by Article 125 of the transitional provisions, now repealed.
The defense argued the substitution transformed the hearing judge’s decision qualitatively and functionally: the motivation was no longer a harmless surplus but the “explicitation of the logical path” leading the judge to find conviction reasonably foreseeable, built on investigative material the trial judge should not be allowed to weigh.
On that reading, the decree became a “provisional sentence of anticipated conviction,” damaging defense rights and colliding with the presumption of innocence. The brief added that the labeled defendant would face a “motivated project of conviction” that cannot be appealed, and that no procedural instrument existed to contest a decree presenting him as “presumed guilty.”
In a subsidiary argument, the defense asked the Court to rule Article 425(3) unconstitutional, citing Articles 27 and 117 of the Constitution, Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 4 of EU Directive 2016/343, plus the fair-trial and defense guarantees of Articles 111 and 24, according to Altalex.
Why the court said no
The Sixth Section declared the appeal inadmissible because it targeted a decree that is not appealable — and, after implementation of Directive 2016/343, no longer capable of qualifying as abusive, since the ad hoc remedy of Article 115-bis now exists, Altalex reported.
Abuse of power, in the court’s taxonomy, comes in two forms: structural, when an authority acts without power, and functional, when a lawful act freezes a proceeding or makes it impossible to continue. A motivated indictment decree fits neither, the judges wrote.
It produces no procedural standstill and is one of the two ordinary outcomes of the preliminary hearing, so it is not issued in lack of power, and the presence of reasoning does not distort the act or its effect.
The court also rejected the claim that a reasoned decree prejudices the impartiality of the trial judge.
That judge will not be bound by the earlier assessment, which was calibrated on a less demanding parameter than the “beyond every reasonable doubt” standard of Article 533, and remains subject to the ordinary rules on reading investigative records under Articles 511 through 514 — not because those files were cited in the decree, a point the court grounded in its own ruling n. 23639/2024.
The stralcio route survives
The heart of the decision is the remedy. Case law even before Article 115-bis, the court recalled, recognized the interested party’s ability to seek removal — stralcio — of content exceeding the function of the order to stand trial, a line it traced to its ruling n. 8836 of February 3, 2020, issued under the previous legal framework.
What was once built by pretorian practice now rests on the general discipline of Article 115-bis, introduced to transpose Directive 2016/343, whose Article 4(1) bars presenting a suspect or defendant as guilty before guilt is established by a final conviction.
The defense had argued that safeguard applied only to paragraph 1 of the provision, not to the indictment decree in paragraph 2. The court’s inadmissibility ruling leaves the stralcio mechanism as the operative protection.
Altalex noted the court walked through the Cartabia legislature’s intent: after decades of attempts, from 1988 to 2022, to sharpen the preliminary hearing’s filter function and curb the stereotype of the investigating judge as a mere “paper-passer” forwarding cases that later ended in acquittals, the 2022 reform tightened the funnel by requiring the hearing judge to test whether the prosecution’s file — and any material acquired by the court or indicated by the defense under Articles 421-bis, 422 and 391-octies — supports a reasonable forecast of conviction, a standard the court described as homologous to thedismissal-review test.
What it means going forward
The practical division of labor now reads: the decree may say why, the defense may ask for the excision of passages that brand the defendant guilty, and the constitutional question stays unresolved because the appeal never reached it.
Earlier Sixth Section rulings cited in the case file — n. 8927/2025, n. 1276/2025 and n. 23639/2024 — now sit alongside n.
“Presumed guilty” is what the decree may no longer leave standing in the file — and removing it is now a request, not an appeal.