How Financial Pressure Can Address Sudan’s Military Coup and Kleptocratic Power Structure
Sudan’s military dissolved the country’s civilian-led transitional government on October 25, ending the power-sharing arrangement that had guided the country since Omar al-Bashir’s ouster in April 2019 and derailing elections planned for 2023.
The coup, reported and analyzed by the anti-corruption watchdog group The Sentry, did not come out of nowhere. It followed months of escalating tension in which the security services resisted civilian oversight, balked at accountability for past atrocities, and defended a web of commercial interests built during the Bashir era, The Sentry reported.
The takeover, in the group’s assessment, is less a rupture in Sudan’s power dynamics than their exposure.
Thousands of Sudanese poured into the streets of Khartoum on the day of the coup and again during planned demonstrations on October 30. The security services answered with force. In the week after the takeover, they killed 12 protesters and wounded hundreds, according to The Sentry, while troops deployed across Khartoum and other population centers and internet and telecommunications networks were disrupted.
What happens next depends, the group argues, on whether the international community targets the thing the security services value most: their money.
A coup rooted in the Bashir era
The transitional government took shape after April 2019, when sustained protests ended al-Bashir’s three-decade rule. A military-civilian partnership was meant to steer Sudan toward democratic elections in 2023. That partnership dissolved on October 25 when the military seized full control.
The Sentry’s analysis places the coup within what it calls a violent kleptocratic system inherited from the Bashir years. Throughout the transition, the security services maintained a range of commercial interests and relationships with foreign patrons, the group reported.
Control of the state, in this reading, is not an ideological project — it is a business model, one that lets security officials accrue wealth while shielding themselves from accountability for past and future abuses.
That framing explains why the group sees the coup as destabilizing but not transformative. The power dynamics in Khartoum, The Sentry concluded, have not fundamentally shifted. They have simply come into public view.
Financial pressure as a tool
The policy response The Sentry outlines is specific. Governments and international agencies should impose targeted network sanctions on the Sudanese officials involved in the coup and on those responsible for abuses committed by security forces afterward. Sanctions should also reach the networks of companies controlled by Sudanese military and security agencies, the group said.
One recommendation stands out for its institutional detail: the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the U.S. Treasury bureau known as FinCEN, should issue an advisory flagging the money laundering risks tied to the Sudan Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, and the companies under their control. Such advisories, aimed at banks and other financial institutions, formalize the warning that transactions touching those entities carry compliance risk.
The group also addressed how financial pressure is communicated. Public diplomacy around sanctions, The Sentry argued, requires specificity and an acknowledgment of sanctions’ difficult legacy in Sudan, paired with focused efforts to counter disinformation.
What negotiators should not concede
The objectives of any negotiated settlement, the group said, must reflect the stated goals of Sudan’s population. The foundation of an agreement should be a civilian-led transitional government with full executive powers, and the security services — especially their finances — must be brought under civilian oversight and control.
Some concessions to the military may prove necessary and inevitable, The Sentry acknowledged. But two are off the table: continued free rein over Sudan’s lucrative economic sectors, and amnesty for perpetrators of atrocities and war crimes.
The private sector has a role to play without waiting for governments, the group added. Foreign companies, including banks, should assess their commercial ties to Sudan to ensure they are not inadvertently funding the security services.
Why the stakes extend beyond Khartoum
For Sudanese citizens, the immediate picture is grim: telecommunications disrupted, troops in population centers, and a death toll of 12 with hundreds wounded in the coup’s first week, per The Sentry.
The question of influence
The core of The Sentry’s argument is that restoring the transition requires leverage, and leverage requires financial pressure. The coup brought the security services’ incentive structures into the open; the international response, the group contends, must now confront those structures directly rather than treat the takeover as a negotiating hiccup.
Whether that pressure arrives may determine whether Sudan returns to the civilian-led path broken on October 25 — or settles into the system the coup was designed to preserve. The group’s bottom line: any deal that leaves the military’s wealth and impunity intact is no deal at all.