Foot and Mouth Disease: 25 Years On – A Dutch Farmer’s Story
On April 10, 2001, veterinarian Peter Egberink recognized the telltale signs of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) during a farm visit in Noordoost-Fryslân, the Netherlands. The following day, the case was officially confirmed as the first instance of FMD in the province, originating at the farm of Piet Meindertsma. Within days, dozens of farms were slated for culling, marking the beginning of a crisis that would devastate the region’s agricultural landscape.
Egberink, then chairman of the Friesian section of the Royal Netherlands Veterinary Association, found himself at the epicenter of the outbreak. He described a period of nearly two weeks where he remained almost entirely within the affected zone, accompanying farmers and the teams tasked with the grim work of animal eradication. “In those first ten days, it felt as though the infected area was almost completely emptied,” Egberink recalled in a recent interview with the Friesch Dagblad.
between sixty and seventy farms in Fryslân were culled during the outbreak, representing a significant number of cattle, but also a disproportionately large number of sheep. The economic and emotional toll was immense. Farms stood empty, milk machines silent, and generations of breeding stock and genetic lines were lost in a single, decisive action.
The speed and severity of the outbreak underscored the highly contagious nature of FMD. Egberink explained that infected animals can spread the virus even before developing antibodies, and recovered animals can remain carriers. At the time, a marker vaccine – one that allows vaccinated animals to be distinguished from infected ones – was unavailable. This absence, coupled with international trade concerns, heavily influenced the Dutch government’s policy of widespread culling. Countries were unwilling to import products from regions where FMD might be present, demanding guarantees of a virus-free status.
According to Egberink, the R0 value – a measure of transmissibility – for the virus was around 14, meaning one infected animal could infect fourteen others in a short period. This necessitated rapid ring culling and strict isolation measures. The origin of the virus remained elusive, with theories circulating regarding a rendering plant, Rendac, in Sumar, and migratory birds, but wind patterns and investigative reports made these explanations unlikely.
The social and emotional impact extended beyond the immediate economic losses. Egberink praised the resilience of many Friesian farmers, noting that most were able to rebuild their businesses. However, for some, the crisis proved insurmountable. He also described the lasting emotional effects on those involved in the culling process, recalling a lingering sensitivity to the sound of cranes used to load animals for disposal.
Unlike some other regions of the Netherlands, such as the Veluwe, Fryslân experienced relatively little public resistance to the culling measures, with a prevailing attitude of pragmatism and a focus on rapid disease control. Egberink had publicly advocated in March 2001 for culling animals from at-risk areas and for large-scale vaccination, coupled with local consumption of meat to circumvent export restrictions. These proposals were not feasible at the time, but a marker vaccine is now available, allowing for the potential export of meat from vaccinated animals.
However, market reactions remain a significant uncertainty. If importing countries refuse to accept products from vaccinated animals, the sector will face tricky choices. Improvements in animal traceability and registration systems since the 2001 outbreak are considered a key “lesson learned,” aimed at reducing the risk of future outbreaks.
The interview with Egberink is part of a series by the Friesch Dagblad examining the FMD crisis of 2001, exploring its technical, emotional, and administrative dimensions. The Dutch government has not yet announced any new preventative measures beyond the existing traceability systems.