China’s MSS Runs Covert Campaign to Secure AI Chips, NYT Reports
China’s Ministry of State Security has been running a covert campaign for at least two years to secure advanced artificial intelligence semiconductors, according to reports from The New York Times.
- The Ministry of State Security formed a specialized working group reporting directly to Minister Chen Yixin to bypass Western export controls.
- China’s Central Science and Technology Commission, established by President Xi Jinping in 2023, coordinates the broader national strategy for technological self-reliance.
- The Trump administration announced on Monday a new regulation restricting overseas data centers from providing significant computing power to entities in China, Russia, and Iran.
The campaign prioritizes the acquisition and smuggling of chips that the United States government has barred firms like Nvidia from exporting to China. In January, Xi Jinping directed the Politburo to solve “chokehold” problems, calling for extraordinary measures to intensify the development of core technologies, as reported by The New York Times.
During this period, when Xi visited energy and computing facilities in Beijing and surrounding regions, he emphasized that “Computing power is a major indicator of overall national power,” according to Xinhua, China’s official news agency.
In April, he wrote in a Communist Party journal that China must “deepen the struggle against blockades” and resolve issues regarding technologies that cannot be obtained through standard purchasing. By updating the espionage agency’s priorities this year, the ministry added a specific goal of overcoming barriers to technologies Xi views as vital to the nation’s rise.
“He is telling his officers to find more ways to wage this struggle.”
The strategy includes utilizing business entities as potential covers for intelligence gathering. The New York Times reported that US officials are investigating Megaspeed, a Singapore-based firm founded by Alice Huang, for allegedly smuggling advanced chips and providing high-end computing capacity to Chinese companies. While US officials allege Huang worked with Chinese intelligence to spy on Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, China has officially dismissed these espionage claims as “pure fabrication.”
Beijing elevates artificial intelligence as national security priority
China’s senior leadership views the mastery of artificial intelligence as a critical strategic requirement, explicitly linking progress in that field to dominance in semiconductor manufacturing. Gregory Allen, a former official at the U.S. Department of Defense’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, said that Beijing understands these technologies are inextricably connected to future national power.

Following his appointment as state security minister in late 2022, Chen Yixin oversaw a major change in the ministry's focus. Within just over a year, the agency issued a formal warning that artificial intelligence would likely transform national security in the near future. By 2024, the ministry reported internal successes in countering efforts by the United States and other Western nations to restrict China to low-end technology markets.
Espionage agency mobilizes for technological independence
The Ministry of State Security has reframed its operational mandate to position its officers as a primary force in the national drive for advanced technological self-reliance. This directive encourages personnel to view the acquisition of restricted computing hardware as a vital component of the country’s broader rise on the global stage.
According to reporting by The New York Times, Alice Huang has not provided any response to multiple requests for comment regarding her alleged role in these activities. Meanwhile, the ministry continues to emphasize that its mission is to overcome foreign barriers that Xi Jinping deems unacceptable obstacles to China’s development.
Ongoing Investigations and Uncertainties
The ministry’s campaign, which involves collecting intelligence on semiconductor supply chains and assisting in smuggling operations, has remained a focus for security officials across Asia, the United States, and Europe.
This effort to secure advanced hardware is intended to mobilize research institutions and scientists to achieve total independence from foreign suppliers. As part of this push, the agency has been encouraged to treat the competition over AI capacity as a top, long-term priority.
The Ministry of State Security maintains domestic powers as an all-source intelligence and secret police agency, utilizing the State Security Police to detain and interrogate individuals within its own private facilities through extrajudicial authorities known as an “invitation to tea.” Since its 1983 formation, this mandate has empowered the ministry to function as both a domestic security force and a foreign espionage organization.
The ministry’s current mission to procure AI chips integrates these traditional counterintelligence and espionage roles by applying its expansive authority to the “hidden front.” By leveraging its secret police, the agency treats technological acquisition as a vital state security objective, ensuring that intelligence gathering and covert actions are synchronized to secure the hardware necessary for the nation’s strategic rise.
The full extent of Alice Huang’s involvement remains unclear, as she has not responded to requests for comment. The new US export rules, which target data center access to bypass earlier chip bans, are set to take effect in approximately 90 days. It is not yet known how the specialized working group under Chen Yixin will pivot its tactics in response to these incoming US licensing requirements.