Myanmar Jet Fuel Smuggling: Ghost Ships Linked to Iran Fuel Deadly Strikes
Summary of Vessels Involved in Suspected Aviation Fuel Shipments to Myanmar
This text details an examination into shipments of aviation fuel possibly supplied to Myanmar’s military, focusing on the vessels used for transport and raising concerns about Iranian involvement. Here’s a breakdown of each vessel mentioned:
1. HUITONG 78 (IMO 9864498):
* Flag: Chinese
* Shipments: Delivered one shipment in July 2024.
* Key Findings: AIS data shows it was at FOAA (UAE) in June 2024 before traveling to Myanmar. Involved in product transfers and other maritime services.
2. YONG SHENG 56 (IMO 9657507, now LS MERCURY):
* Flag: Chinese
* Shipments: Delivered one shipment in July 2024.
* Key Findings: Similar to HUITONG 78, it was at FOAA (UAE) in June 2024 and then traveled to myanmar.
3. REEF (IMO 9263382, formerly BALTIC HORIZON):
* Flag: Guinea
* Shipments: Delivered shipments in October 2024, July 2025, and October 2025.
* Key Findings:
* AIS discrepancy: AIS data places it near Kuwait/UAE, but satellite imagery confidently places it at Bandar Abbas, Iran in September 2025.
* AIS Manipulation: Displays unusual “box-shaped” loitering patterns off the coast of Iran, inconsistent with normal ship behavior, suggesting AIS spoofing.
* Sanction History: Previously identified by US OFAC for transporting sanctioned fuel from Iran.
4.NOBLE (IMO 9162928, formerly ASTRA):
* Flag: Guinea
* shipments: Delivered four shipments between January and June 2025.
* Key Findings:
* AIS/Imagery Conflict: Loitered at FOAA (UAE) and turned off AIS en route to Myanmar, but satellite imagery places it at Bandar Abbas, Iran after FOAA and before Myanmar (June 2025).
* Sanction History: Previously identified by US OFAC for transporting sanctioned fuel from Iran.
* Sighted at Iran: Has been sighted at Bandar Abbas port in the last 13 months.
Overall Concerns & Indicators:
* Iranian Connection: Multiple indicators suggest a link to Iran, including the vessels’ history of transporting sanctioned Iranian fuel, sightings at Bandar Abbas, and analysis by Kpler suggesting all shipments originated from Iran.
* “Ghost Fleet” Tactics: The vessels exhibit behaviors common to tankers involved in moving sanctioned fuel, such as AIS gaps, anomalous tracks, spoofing, and opaque ship-to-ship (STS) transfers.
* AIS manipulation: The REEF vessel’s AIS data is notably suspicious, showing unnatural patterns and contradicting satellite imagery.
The investigation highlights a potential circumvention of sanctions and raises serious questions about the source of aviation fuel being supplied to Myanmar’s military.
