Key Takeaways from the Text:
This piece argues that simply acquiring new technologies (like drones and AI) isn’t enough to create a “new way of warfare.” It draws parallels to past military revolutions like combined arms maneuver and airland Battle, emphasizing that doctrine, concepts, and cultural shifts are the primary drivers of real change, with technology serving as an enabler rather than the solution itself.
Here’s a breakdown of the main points:
* Ukraine’s Drone Use is Not a Blueprint: While Ukraine’s innovative use of drones is noteworthy, it’s a response to shortcomings in other areas (artillery, infantry) and has resulted in stalemate, not a breakthrough. NATO shouldn’t blindly copy this approach.
* Past Revolutions Highlight the Process: Triumphant military transformations (like AirLand Battle) weren’t just about new gadgets. They involved a systematic process of:
* research & Development
* Operational Analysis
* Experimentation & Trials
* Realistic training
* Holistic Development is Crucial (TEPIDOIL/DOTMLPF-P): Change needs to encompass all aspects of military capability – Doctrine, Training, Force Design, Logistics, etc. (represented by the acronyms TEPIDOIL and DOTMLPF-P). This will likely require changes to force structure and career paths.
* Integration is Key: New technologies are most effective when integrated with existing capabilities (tanks, artillery, airpower) and supported by coherent operational concepts.
* Decision Cycles are Accelerating: Technology is enabling faster decision-making, compressing command levels, and increasing weapon ranges. This will fundamentally change planning at all levels.
* Vision is Paramount: A new way of warfare must first be envisioned before technology can be effectively applied. The author remembers the excitement around networked warfare (“second offset”) but cautions against focusing solely on which technologies “worked” and which didn’t.
In essence, the author is advocating for a thoughtful, systemic approach to military modernization, prioritizing conceptual development and integration over simply chasing the latest technology. He warns against superficial lessons learned from the war in Ukraine and emphasizes the importance of learning from the successes (and failures) of past military revolutions.
