Russia’s international reputation is already in tatters. The last thing it needs now is another humiliating blow that would reveal how little influence it actually has over Balkan affairs as its priorities diverge from those of its associates, writes Maxim Samorukov for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has significantly expanded the range of foreign policy tools that the Kremlin deems acceptable to use. While the Russian military bombs and razes Ukrainian cities and deliberately leaves people without heat and electricity in sub-zero temperatures, Moscow can hardly be expected to show humanity on other international issues. The Kremlin is grimly willing to overlook the cost of its most destructive actions provided they further its cause in Ukraine, yet Russia has been eerily quiet in the Western Balkans. How come?
The Western Balkans are often seen as an easy target for Moscow. Neighboring the European Union and perpetually volatile, the region also maintains significant ties to Russia. This combination appears to offer the Kremlin a convenient opportunity to stir up trouble there to divert Western attention and resources away from helping Ukraine.
Nine months into the war, however, Moscow seems in no hurry to take advantage of this opportunity. Amid the renewed escalation of tensions in most of the Balkan states, Russia has remained largely on the sidelines, sticking to its previous tactics and narratives, as if 2022 has not upended the geopolitics and geoeconomy of the enlarged Europe. At first glance, the Kremlin’s caution may seem illogical, but it seems less so if we take a closer look at the long-standing constraints on Russia’s policy in the region, which have been further strengthened by the war.
The contrast between Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine and moderation in the Balkans stems from its heavy reliance on Balkan politicians. Russia’s direct presence in the region has always been limited, but its visibility and influence are greatly increased by a range of local actors. Their agenda differed little from Moscow’s: they sought to halt pro-European reforms, exploited anti-Western sentiment, and stoked inter-ethnic discord. These common interests made them natural partners, who exaggerated their affinity to strengthen each other’s influence.
Yet, however diligently some Balkan politicians portrayed themselves as pro-Russian, they remained distinctly autonomous in their actions. Moscow was welcome to pretend to be in charge when its priorities coincided with those of its domestic allies, but it was hardly in a position to make unilateral changes to the common agenda. The locals may have played the role of reckless pro-Russian radicals, but in reality their radicalism was mostly feigned and aimed solely at resisting any change that might threaten their power and privileges.
Significant reforms and a permanent settlement of the Balkan conflicts posed a more viable threat, but both Russia and its regional allies realized that overstatement could create problems for them by provoking a strong response from the West. So they stuck to the status quo through the moderate application of their radicalism: preventing positive change rather than causing negative change.
While the war has changed the calculus that feeds Moscow’s appetite for destabilization, it has not for its key Balkan collaborators. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, pro-Russian politicians in Montenegro and so on still value their current privileged status and have no desire to jeopardize it in the name of Moscow’s geopolitical adventurism. If the Kremlin risks trying to impose its will on them, the attempt is likely to backfire, with locals simply resisting any pressure from Moscow.
Russia’s international reputation is already in tatters. The last thing he needs now is another humiliating blow that would reveal how little influence he actually has over Balkan affairs once his priorities diverge from those of his associates. It is therefore no wonder that Moscow prefers to stick to the old rules of its regional alliances, even if this position does not fully correspond to its new bellicose agenda.
The war also changed Moscow’s decision-making process, undermining its ability to pursue an active foreign policy on several fronts simultaneously. President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s supreme authority on all international affairs, has become even more reticent and reluctant to share his plans with his subordinates or delegate the initiative to them. He has also become erratic and unpredictable in his decisions, leaving the Russian state apparatus with no idea what the president’s next step might be.
This reality largely precludes autonomous action at the lower levels of Russia’s foreign policy “elite”, including the part responsible for the Western Balkans. Moscow’s Balkan specialists fear that unsolicited new initiatives could clash with the president’s expectations and land him in trouble. They prefer to play it safe and follow time-tested instructions, however outdated they may seem now. Meanwhile, the new directives are unlikely to materialize anytime soon, as the Russian president seems completely preoccupied with an invasion of Ukraine.
As a result, the main driver of Russia’s current policy in the Western Balkans is the growing fear that the war in Ukraine could prompt the West to implement quick fixes to the Balkan conflicts and eliminate Russia from the region altogether. A major setback in Serbia or Bosnia-Herzegovina would draw Putin’s attention to Balkan issues, exposing those in charge of the region to the president’s wrath. To avoid this, they shun sudden moves and hope that Russia’s regional partners will still be able to withstand mounting Western pressure and protect the status quo.
To this end, Russia continues to declare its full support for Vucic’s hardline stance on Kosovo and issued a timely invitation to Dodik to the Kremlin to assist him in his re-election as president of Republika Srpska. But Moscow is clearly taking a back seat in the region and letting the locals bear the brunt of resistance to the West.
Given the arbitrariness of many of Putin’s recent decisions, there can be no guarantee that at some point the Russian leader will not concoct a new geopolitical scheme targeting Western vulnerabilities in the Western Balkans. But for now, there are more indications of a momentum scenario in which Russia relies on the stubbornness of local politicians to help it save face in the region.
