According to the version of events propagated in 1920, the commander-in-chief suffered a mental breakdown a few days before the start of the most important fights. He was supposed to be exhausted from months of stress and chickened out. The fuel for these accusations is factthat on August 12, i.e. the day before the start of the fighting near Warsaw, he handed his resignation to Prime Minister Wincenty Witos and left the capital to the south. The orders for the fighting troops were given by General Tadeusz Rozwadowski, Chief of the General Staff.
The troublesome figure of the marshal
Why, at all, in view of the great success in the war with the Bolsheviks, political fights began in Warsaw almost immediately? This was due to the fact that Piłsudski had in fact many enemies in Poland. The best organized and most popular political grouping at that time was the so-called “National Democracy” from the ND – National Democracy. She represented right-wing, conservative and national views and was associated with the Catholic Church. Piłsudski, on the other hand, was a declared leftist, a long-time activist of the PPS – Polish Socialist Party. The marshal’s views automatically put him in opposition to the National Democratic Party. In the face of countless challenges facing the resurgent Second Polish Republic, both sides were able to cooperate relatively efficiently, but there was no love between them. On the contrary.
As long as on the Polish front army was successful, Piłsudski was praised for so long. The apogee of adoration fell on the success of the “Kiev expedition”, which resulted in the capture of Kiev in May 1920. Piłsudski was then feted, also by the National Democratic Party, as the second Bolesław Chrobry. However, when a month later the situation turned and the Bolsheviks began to beat the Polish army, so did the narrative of the marshal’s opponents. Almost overnight, he was accused of treason. Piłsudski himself, according to the recollections of many people, was then clearly depressed and mentally exhausted. He was to be pessimistic about the future.
This was overlapped by the fact that Piłsudski was not liked by the Western Allies, who perceived him as a wayward adventurer, stubbornly initiating conflicts with his neighbors and demanding more for Poland than he reasonably deserves. The great powers were not willing to support Poland decisively as long as the marshal was at its helm. It was signaled that his dismissal was expected.
When the commander-in-chief leaves the capital
It was in such an atmosphere that preparations for the Battle of Warsaw continued. There is no doubt that its general plan was selected from various options and approved for implementation by Piłsudski on August 6. Four days later, final amendments were made to it. Two days later, the marshal resigned and left the capital. His opponents then accused him of betrayal and desertion, and today he has a nervous breakdown. Proponents consistently argue that this was evidence of the utmost concern for the state.
In the opinion of the latter, it is enough to carefully read the text of the resignation, which was blank and secret. Witos was to use it and accept it at the moment he saw fit. Piłsudski was certainly aware of the attitude of the Western allies towards him. His resignation was a known condition for helping Poland. So he left it in his hands premiere the document that in accident The defeat in the Battle of Warsaw might have helped him in trying to gain some support in the face of the total collapse of the state.
It is true that Piłsudski disappeared from public space for a few days. All orders given to the army were signed by Rozwadowski at that time. It was he who was touring the troops in the outskirts of Warsaw and encouraging them to fight. It was he who reacted to the changing situation on the battlefield and gave the appropriate instructions. At that time, Piłsudski was to go towards Puławy, where troops were gathering to carry out the planned counterattack. However, disputes continue to this day about how much the marshal was in a hurry to join this army. According to his wife’s recollections, on August 15 he visited his family on an estate in Bobowo, beyond Tarnów, over 300 kilometers south of Warsaw. He was supposed to be clearly depressed and say goodbye to loved ones as if he were going to death.
According to other sources, however, he was in Puławy on August 13, where he supervised the preparations for the offensive. On August 14, he was to take part in baptisms in the city church. Perhaps he did go to his family later, though there is no clear picture of what the marshal actually was doing during those days. This was the subject of disputes as early as 1920. There is no doubt that when he returned to Warsaw on August 18 after the battle, he considered the subject of his resignation to be non-existent and he was willing to accept the words of praise addressed to him.
It was then that the term “miracle on the Vistula” was born almost immediately, which later irritated Piłsudski himself and his followers. It was an undisguised suggestion that, first, the chief had led to a hopeless situation in which only God’s intervention could help, and secondly, that it was the divine intervention, not the marshal’s plan and the army’s effort, that led to the victory. For the marshal and his supporters, it was no miracle, but a battle won.
An order issued by Rozwadowski at the beginning of the Battle of Warsaw Fig. public domain / CAW
Victory of the nation, not the leader
Regardless of the disputes that arose as early as 1920 and continue thanks to historians to this day, there is no doubt that Piłsudski was the commander-in-chief and the Chief of State throughout the entire battle. The ultimate responsibility rested with him. He was the one who finally decided on the battle plan. He would be the one on whom criticism would focus in the event of failure. According to the proverb “success has many fathers, failure is an orphan”.
There is no doubt, however, that Piłsudski would never have won this battle on his own. If it were not for General Rozwadowski, who in his slightly chaotic but tireless style efficiently managed the course of the battle, and had previously developed its precise plan, there would be no victory. Were it not for the most talented officers of their generation in the person of General Władysław Sikorski and Józef Haller, there would be no victory either. If it were not for Witos’ persistent management of the state during the greatest crisis, there might be nothing to fight for. If not for the breaking of the codes by cryptographers … If it were not for the cavalry raid on Ciechanów and the capture of the Bolshevik staff of the 4th Army … And so on.
Great events like the Battle of Warsaw are never achievements of an individual, but a coincidence of many factors. General Maxime Weygand, head of the Allied advisory mission in Warsaw, leaving for the battle to Francewas to say:
This victory, which is the reason for the great holiday in Warsaw, is a Polish victory. Military operations were performed by Polish generals according to the Polish operational plan. It was the heroic Polish nation that saved itself.
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