What do they think about the war with Ukraine in Russia
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The call to the trenches is not included in the social contract, and even in the conditions of accelerating inflation and stagnation of all macroeconomic indicators.
Ukraine has been intimidated for a month with a new attack by Russia. And what is the attitude of the Russian Federation to a possible new armed conflict with Ukraine? To this question tried to answer expert of the Carnegie Moscow Center Andrey Kolesnikov.
The situation has changed
In 2015, a Carnegie Center study titled Do the Russians Want War? showed that in modern urbanized society the idea of a real big war is perceived without enthusiasm.
Military actions in Donbass in 2014 against the background of the triumphant capture of Crimea were perceived in Russia very positively. However, as soon as it became clear that Donetsk and Lugansk are a slightly different format of military operation, much more bloody and destructive, public opinion went into a standard defensive position, putting a psychological block: Russia has nothing to do with it, the United States and Ukraine are to blame for human casualties. but in general there is no war.
The unprecedented patriotic upsurge of 2014 worked as a symbolic compensation for the emerging socio-economic problems for several years. Russians willingly bought real and perceived threats, sold by the state wholesale and retail, and assessed any military actions waged by Putin’s Russia as just, defensive and / or preventive.
The wars went on in a kind of routine background – the TV did not convey the smell of gunpowder, construction dust from destroyed houses, trench clay, sweat and blood, Kolesnikov writes.
However, since about 2018, a significant part of the sociological parameters began to change: the rally around the flag fizzled out. If in 2014 26% of respondents believed that Russia was surrounded by enemies from all sides, then in 2020 this opinion was shared by only 16% of respondents. Over the same period, the share of Russians who believe that it is pointless to look for enemies, because the root of evil lies in their own mistakes, increased from 17% to 25% over the same period.
The consensus on Crimea and the symbolic power of state institutions remained, but lost its mobilizing significance. The war has ceased to please, it has begun to frighten.
We were not prepared for this
The Russian conformist, of course, is a militant individual, but this is the belligerence of propaganda television talk shows or the hate speech of social networks. No conformist wants a big war, conscription into the trenches is not included in the social contract, and even in conditions of accelerating inflation and stagnation of all macroeconomic indicators that have microeconomic significance when it comes to the degradation of the social component of everyday life, Kolesnikov notes.
Of course, when it comes to a hot war, we mean the battle with Ukraine (even if it means NATO, the United States, the West). Of course, in the event of a war, state propaganda will convince the majority of Russians that this is how it should be and that Russia is in fact “liberating” the brotherly Ukrainian people from the power alien to them, which, however, he himself chose in fair and free elections. And this is despite the fact that even in 2021, when the United States and Ukraine are the main enemies, 23% of Russians believe that it is necessary to live with Ukraine in a neighborly, friendly way, but with borders and visas, like with any other country (unification 17% support one state).
War is a young and inviting business. But 66% of Russians in the 18-24 age cohort have a good or very good attitude towards Ukraine. And this is against the background of Ukrainianship and the dominance of the ideologeme on the western front-without-change (in the sense that the adversaries are attacking us, and we are defending ourselves), which does not stop for a day on the state television.
In a word, before carrying out an offensive operation, one probably needs to think about who will fight with what enthusiasm and to what extent the hot phase of the war will mobilize citizens to rally around Putin. Apparently, this degree will be zero at best.
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