Pakistan’s war efforts

On July 4, the Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant-General Rahul R. Singh, confirmed an important aspect of the China-Pakistan nexus that has been discussed in the strategic community since the four-day military hostilities with Pakistan (Operation Sindoor, May 7-10).

Speaking publicly, he said that China was an ever-present factor bolstering Pakistan’s military efforts through unprecedented battlefield collusion during Operation Sindoor. Lt. Gen. Singh also spoke of the military assistance extended by Türkiye, but that was of a much lesser order of magnitude.

In the India-Pakistan military confrontations of 1965 and 1971, and even during the Kargil operations in 1999, China was a background player, offering diplomatic backing and token military gestures on Pakistan’s behalf, without engaging directly in hostilities. This time, however, China’s posture was distinctly more layered and collusive, leveraging its robust defence-industrial base, sophisticated intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, practised interoperability, and geostrategic assets to reinforce Pakistan’s war efforts without overtly crossing red lines. This represents a major progression in China’s traditional strategy of building up Pakistan’s strategic and conventional capabilities through overt and covert help to counter India and keep it off-balance.

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Subtle but strategic diplomatic signalling

In the diplomatic arena, China refrained from condemning the Pahalgam terrorist attack (April 22) until a belated telephonic conversation on May 10 between Foreign Minister Wang Yi and National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval. In fact, China’s official responses mirrored Pakistan’s narrative — advocating a “quick and fair investigation” of the Pahalgam attack and expressing “full understanding” of Islamabad’s “legitimate security concerns”. The May 7 strike by India on terrorist targets was deemed “regrettable” by the Chinese Foreign Office spokesperson. China also collaborated with Pakistan in diluting the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) press statement, excising any direct reference to The Resistance Front, the group behind the Pahalgam attack

Significantly, India avoided any political-level contact with China in the context of Pahalgam and Operation Sindoor (until the NSA’s conversation with Wang Yi), unlike with other UNSC members (excepting Pakistan), signalling India’s assessment of China’s unhelpful stance.

The Chinese media played a very active role in shaping perceptions. State-affiliated platforms amplified Pakistan’s propaganda, which included exaggerated claims about the loss of Indian fighter aircraft. Social media commentators aligned with the Pakistan Army’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR)-fuelled psychological warfare efforts — this included celebrating the alleged success of Chinese-origin military platforms deployed by Pakistan in its first-ever encounter with advanced western weapon platforms in a combat situation.

This digital landscape underscored not only China’s active informational support but also its alignment with Pakistan’s strategic messaging. By omitting the context of the terror attack’s severity, Chinese reports sought to imply that India’s military actions were disproportionate. A recurring theme among Chinese experts was the concern that the crisis could escalate into a nuclear conflict, prompting calls for international diplomatic intervention to prevent further escalation.

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Hardware, ISR and tactical integration

China’s military collusion, however, went beyond diplomatic alignment and propaganda. The less-likely scenario of a “two-front war” — with China and Pakistan launching simultaneous military operations against India — has distinctly metamorphosed into the more imminent challenge of a “one-front reinforced war”, where a conflict with Pakistan can now openly involve China.

For the first time, advanced Chinese-origin systems were visibly employed by Pakistan in a live operational environment. The Pakistan Air Force’s deployment of Chinese J-10C fighters armed with PL-15 beyond-visual-range missiles, alongside HQ-9 air defence systems, demonstrated enhanced capability through operational integration honed over the years of joint exercises such as the Shaheen-series. This interoperability was not just symbolic. It was translated into tactical advantages in real-time combat.

Drones, cyber operations, and net-centric warfare elements employed by Pakistan showed unmistakable imprints of the “Chinese military playbook”. As Lt. Gen. Singh has confirmed, Chinese ISR systems provided real-time data, situational awareness, and surveillance capabilities to the Pakistani forces. Even civilian assets such as the Chinese fishing fleet were reportedly leveraged to monitor Indian naval deployments, while Pakistan’s Navy remained coastal-bound.

China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system played a critical role, including in missile guidance for the PL-15, reaffirming the direct integration of Chinese systems into Pakistani battlefield operations. Reports also indicate the fusion of the Swedish Saab 2000 Erieye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platform alongside Chinese systems to down Indian aircraft, reflecting a sophisticated convergence of multi-origin platforms, many of which are enabled or integrated by Chinese technologies.

This evolving situation compels several conclusions. First, the significant role of Chinese hardware, ISR, and battlefield advisory inputs have radically complicated India’s deterrence framework. China’s ability to provide real-time support without overt military engagement allows it to play a long strategic game. It can test India’s red lines while avoiding direct escalation.

Second, a “new normal” is emerging wherein India finds greater latitude for conventional operations against Pakistan despite the nuclear overhang. China and Pakistan are, in parallel, constructing their own “new normal” of battlefield coordination. This includes stepped-up defence procurements: Pakistan’s announcement on June 6 of China offering it its fifth-generation J-35 stealth fighters, the KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft, and the HQ-19 ballistic missile defence system reinforces its position as the foremost recipient of Chinese frontline military hardware.

Third, Operation Sindoor may have inadvertently served as a “live-fire demonstration” for China’s defence industry, validating its platforms and collecting performance data in real combat against western systems.

This success offers China greater leverage in global arms markets and incentivises continued grey-zone tactics, probing India’s thresholds without initiating open hostilities.

Fourth, India now faces live borders with both China and Pakistan. Despite the October 2024 disengagement in Eastern Ladakh, forces remain heavily deployed along the northern frontier. Simultaneously, the ceasefire along the Line of Control and the international boundary with Pakistan — restored in 2021 — has effectively collapsed.

This dual-front deployment forces India to spread its resources: troops, ISR assets, logistical chains, and conventional platforms must be available simultaneously on both flanks. The demand is not just for preparedness but for sustained deterrence.

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Preparing for the future

India is entering a period where sub-conventional conflict and conventional operations blur across a composite threat from China and Pakistan. This “one-front reinforced” challenge demands strategic imagination, conventional build-up, institutional coordination, and diplomatic clarity.

In light of this altered reality, India must reassess its diplomatic calibration vis-à-vis China. Beijing’s strategic enabling of Pakistan in battlefield conditions must carry costs. If “terror and talks” cannot coexist in India’s Pakistan policy, then strategic collusion by China with Pakistan cannot be decoupled from its bilateral engagement with India.

India may need to signal consequences, both through diplomatic messaging and strategic policy shifts.

An obvious corollary to India’s “new normal” of expanded scope of punitive conventional operations below the nuclear threshold is a significant expansion in conventional capabilities. This includes network centric warfare, non-legacy platforms such as drones, and ISR capabilities to counter Chinese assets. The decline in defence spending, from 17.1% of central expenditure in 2014-15 to 13% in 2025-26, must be revisited if India is to meet the demands of an increasingly complex battlespace.

India must maintain a degree of unpredictability in its response to provocations from Pakistan, avoiding knee-jerk kinetic actions. If India predictably opts for punitive military strike, it could fall in a trap that would be exploited by Pakistan and China acting collusively. Instead, it must also explore alternative forms of retaliatory actions. The abrogation of the Indus Waters Treaty could be one such option, but there are other levers available which can be deployed without publicity.

Battlefield collusion is no longer a theoretical concern; it is a lived experience. Operation Sindoor should not only serve as a lesson in tactical innovation but also as a wake-up call for rethinking India’s defence posture, force modernisation, and strategic signalling. The sooner this reality is integrated into India’s strategic planning, the better prepared India will be for a future shaped not by isolated provocations but by a collusive China-Pakistan challenge across a contested battlespace.

Ashok K. Kantha is a former Ambassador to China, now involved with think-tanks