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Putinism does not work on the battlefield

On January 11, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov is now leading the Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. General Sergei Surovikin, who had been appointed to the same post just three months earlier, was demoted to Gerasimov’s deputy. The displacement has sparked speculation of frustration in the Kremlin at the lack of progress on the battlefield, writes Mark Galeotti for Al Jazeera.

Ironically, Surovikin is recognized by both Russian and Ukrainian fighters as one of Moscow’s most competent commanders. He considered holding the isolated city of Kherson a lost cause and managed to convince President Vladimir Putin to allow him to leave. This is despite the fact that the president wants the city to remain under Russian control. Although a withdrawal under fire is a difficult operation to conduct, Surovikin manages it neatly and with limited casualties.

In another flashpoint – the city of Bakhmut, where heavy fighting was taking place – Surovikin focused on consolidation. He established the so-called “Surovikin lines” of defense in the south and prepared the ground for the influx of mobilized reservists expected before the offensive this year. He also presided over the relentless bombing of Ukraine’s energy and water infrastructure, as much a political as an economic campaign designed to demoralize the population, force the diversion of resources, and perhaps drive more refugees to Europe.

He really seemed relatively competent. However, this was not enough for Putin. Surovikin’s cautious approach did not bring victory on the battlefield, nor did the Ukrainians lose the will to resist.

The final straw appeared to be the Ukrainian missile attack on a barracks near Makeevka on New Year’s Day, which may have killed hundreds of Russian reservists. This is hardly Surovikin’s direct responsibility, rather it is a symptom of incompetence on the part of the Russian officer corpswhich cannot come to terms with the range and accuracy of Ukrainian artillery.

However, Putin wanted a scapegoat, and Surovikin was just that. In many ways, this episode illustrates the extent to which Russia’s war is defined and distorted by politics.

Putin’s entire political system is deliberately competitive and even cannibalistic. Individuals and institutions are encouraged to clash because it allows Putin to exercise the role of “great judge”. Everyone must seek his favor and he can choose whom to reward and whom to punish in order to maintain his power.

What might work in politics, however, turns out to be much more dysfunctional when transferred to the battlefield. Surovikin was given the title of commander of the combined forces, but Putin never gave him the necessary political backing to allow him to manage all the disparate elements under his command as one unified force. In particular, he had no control over the personal troops of the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, and especially over the Wagner mercenary army, under the leadership of businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin.

This undermines any chance of Surovikin being able to make gains on the battlefield. For this he had to pay the price, because the second aspect of Putinism that has proved so problematic is the emphasis on the “heroic leader” able to instantly turn a problem into a triumph. Encouraged by his entourage of cronies and associates, Putin seems to have convinced himself that he is such an instantly transformative leader. This is deeply dubious, as everything that goes right is presented as his achievement, but whatever goes wrong is cast as accusations of failure on his subordinates.

The more stress Putin is under, the more unrealistic his expectations. Last week, for example, the loyal Industry Minister Dennis Manturov was publicly reprimanded to slow domestic aircraft production. As Manturov tried to explain the enormous practical challenges, especially now that Russia is sanctioned and denied Western technology and investment and unable to buy parts of Ukraine, Putin interrupted: “Don’t you understand the circumstances we live in? We have to be in a month, no later.”

Similarly, Putin – who has no significant military experience and little sense of the complexities of modern warfare – appears to have had unrealistic expectations of Surovikin. His response, as usual, is not to acknowledge the scale of the challenge, but to blame the man on the spot. While Surovikin remains in place, he is now just one of three field commanders under their new joint commander: General Gerasimov.

Although the official line is that this is not a demotion for Surovikin, but simply a recognition that the increasing scale of the role requires a more senior commander, the irony is that this is actually a demotion not only for him, but for Gerasimov as well. It is very unusual for a Chief of the General Staff to enter field functions and this also puts him in an unenviable position.

It has long been clear that the Russians plan to launch new offensives early this year, using 150,000 mobilized reservists who have been preparing behind the lines. This is a significant force, but given that the Ukrainians are also regrouping, armed with new supplies of Western weapons, the chances of the Russians being able to make lasting and significant gains are low.

It is likely that Gerasimov’s career now depends on not disappointing Putin’s high hopes, so he may be tempted to escalate. Although there are periodic concerns that Russia might use tactical nuclear weapons, this is still extremely unlikely. It is more likely that Moscow will try to pressure Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to join the war, or that Russian forces will be further expanded through a new wave of mobilization or conscription.

However, these are essentially political decisions above Gerasimov’s pay level. Lukashenko clearly does not want to participate directly. As for a new mobilization or sending in conscripts – who have not yet fought en masse – these measures would be extremely unpopular at home. Although Putin has overseen the creeping militarization of Russian society and economy, he is also acutely aware of the potential risks to a regime whose legitimacy is in decline. Indeed, part of the reason for demoting Surovikin was to try to use him as a scapegoat for recent reversals.

Similarly, although Gerasimov’s appointment was also heralded as a way to improve coordination, unless Putin is inclined to impose himself on Kadyrov or Prigozhin, nothing will change in this area. Prigozhin has already made his contempt for Gerasimov clear, without any reaction from the Kremlin.

Gerasimov is thus the latest and most senior officer to be given a task that he cannot carry out unless Putin is willing to take a political risk and provide him with the necessary support. As long as the aging Russian leader is unwilling to support his generals, it is hard to see how Gerasimov can succeed. Yet he is the senior officer in the Russian army – and Surovikin is his most likely successor. If and when he too fails, it will be even harder for people not to shift ultimate responsibility to Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Putin.

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