Manuel Pablo Maza Miquel, SJ
En the beginning of 1775, an arrogant England imposed its power, invincible until then. On February 25, he outlawed New England trade with all colonies. The settlers were preparing for freedom or death, in the words of Patrick Henry in his March 23 speech.
But on April 19, at the Lexington and Concord clashes, the Americans managed to inflict so many casualties on the British as they retreated to Boston that they had to be rescued by other contingents. It is unknown who fired “the shot that echoed around the world” in Emerson’s phrase. And now the American patriots besieged Boston!
On May 10, the Second American Continental Congress acted as if it were a mouse provoking the English lion: “it issued paper money, passed commercial laws, sent agents abroad for support, helped the colonies organize their own governments.”
George III had already predicted that the issue of the colonies would be resolved by blows, now, on June 14, the rebel colonists created the Continental Army. Its commander, George Washington, would later write: “When I took command of the continental army I hated independence.”
The Bunker Hill confrontation on June 17 caused considerable losses to the British. The polarization between rebel and royalist settlers was growing. The Continental Congress, which French avant la léttre, demanded every man to join the army.
When the Continental Congress formally declared war on England on July 6, very few colonists wanted it. John Adams calculated that a third of the population was in favor of the war, the other was indifferent and “the remaining third, made up of the richest, most cultivated and prudent men, who naturally opposed violence, were supporters of the King.” An estimated 100,000 royalists left the colonies or were exiled. (Cárdenas, 1998: 110-111).
The story is interesting when it tells how the improbable happened. At the beginning of the war, the North American insurgents numbered “about two million, they lacked industrial resources. They had no weapons, no ammunition, they did not want to leave their homes, and the volunteers had a limited time contract. These troops without military value, badly organized, could they face an organized and disciplined European army? ” (MB Bennassar and others, 2005: 1010).
The author is Professor
Associate of PUCMM
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