Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to overcome major structural challenges in his attempts to do so mobilized a large number of Russians, continue the war in Ukraine.
This was stated by the daily analysis of the situation in Ukraine by the Institute for the study of war.
The “partial mobilization” that he ordered on 21 Septemberit will generate additional forces, but ineffectively e with a high internal social and political cost. Crucially, the forces generated by this “partial mobilization” are highly unlikely to significantly contribute to increasing the net combat power of the Russian military in 2022.
Russia has admitted “excesses” in military mobilization
The authorities are intervening
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Putin will have to address the fundamental shortcomings in the personnel and equipment systems of the Russian armed forces in order for the mobilization to have a significant impact even in the long term.
His actions so far show that he is far more interested in throwing people onto the battlefield than in address these serious shortcomings.
Since at least 2008, the Russian armed forces have not created the conditions for effective large-scale mobilization and have not built up the necessary reserve forces for rapid mobilization aimed at producing immediate results on the battlefield. These problems do not have quick solutions.
The Russian military attempted to switch to a volunteer-only force during the 2008 financial crisis, but failed to complete the transition. The end of the Cold War and the demonstration during the 1991 Gulf War of the advantages of a full-fledged army led many countries to renounce conscription models.
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After the partial mobilization, Putin is considering introducing martial law
The Kremlin can ban men from traveling abroad
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The Russian military remained committed to the cadre and reserve service model until 2008, when Putin ordered his new Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov to switch to a professional model and reform the Russian military to save costs after the financial crisis of 2008.
Eventually, the Russian army became a hybrid model, combining conscripts and professional soldiers. A professional army is expensive because the state must offer potential volunteer recruits much higher salaries and benefits than conscripts who have no choice but to serve. Serdyukov quickly discovered that Russia’s defense budget could not afford to make offers tempting enough to overcome Russia’s centuries-old resistance to drafting. Hence the Russian army turns into a blend of professional soldiers and conscripts of one year.
The reduction in conscription from 2 to a year only worsened the training of the recruits. On the other hand, Russia has missed the opportunity to have trained and trained reservists who can be mobilized when needed, notes ISW.
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Putin launches Crimean Tatars on the front line in Ukraine
Authorities avoid mobilization among ethnic Russians
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Analysts remember this in recent months Putin made four attempts at partial mobilization.
In the fall of 2021, the Russian military launched an initiative called the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) with the goal of recruiting 100,000 volunteers to train and be ready for combat while still in reserve. the Russian invasion in February 2022. manages to recruit few volunteers.
Secondly, the Russian armed forces carried out a forced mobilization of part of their regular reserve in preparation for the invasion of Ukraine. Details of such a mobilization are scarce, but Western officials said the Russian military has called in “tens of thousands” of reservists to fill the ranks. before the invasion of Ukraine.
Third, a smaller wave of mobilization followed the invasion itself, as reports emerged of thousands of reservists called to replace Russian losses in early March 2022.
In June 2022 Putin launched a fourth attempt to mobilize the population for war, accelerated in July, with a call for the formation of “volunteer battalions”.
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Ramzan Kadyrov: There will be no mobilization in Chechnya
The region had exceeded its mobilization quota
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This feat was an attempt at secrecy or cryptomobilization. The Kremlin has ordered all of Russia’s “federal subjects” to create at least one volunteer battalion and to pay out of their own bonus budgets for joining the army and participating in hostilities. These efforts have led to the creation of a number of volunteer battalions, some of them they have already fought badly in Ukraine.
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