The debate over cluster munitions has resurfaced as Europe grapples with bolstering its defenses against potential Russian aggression. These weapons, notorious for scattering numerous small bombs over a wide area, have been internationally condemned due to their high civilian casualty rates. More then 100 nations, predominantly in Europe, have signed a treaty banning their use.

The Core issue: Deterring Russian Aggression

A British think tank suggests that if Europe is serious about defending itself from a potential Russian invasion, it may need to reconsider its stance on cluster munitions.The rationale centers on Europe’s perceived deficiency in ground forces to effectively counter a large-scale Russian invasion.

NATO would need to compensate with airpower to target Russian troops and supply lines, providing its smaller armies a fighting chance. During the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact had a significant advantage, fielding 295 divisions and 69,000 tanks compared to NATO’s 170 divisions and 28,000 tanks.

The Challenge of Russian Air Defenses

Though, Russia’s advanced anti-aircraft defenses pose a significant obstacle to European air operations. Justin Bronk and Jack Watling, in a report for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), highlight this concern:

NATO land forces are overwhelmingly dependent on air power for fires. Without large-scale US assistance, though, European air forces would currently struggle to roll back dense and integrated air defense systems (IADS) such as those protecting Russian forces.

Justin bronk and Jack Watling, Royal United Services Institute

Russia has developed a multi-layered network of mobile short-, medium-, and long-range surface-to-air missiles and radars. This sophisticated system means that any aircraft targeting short- or medium-range missile batteries risks being attacked by long-range missiles.

Modern Russian air defense systems have far greater range, are more mobile, more resilient and significantly more lethal than any faced by NATO forces in conflict, according to RUSI.

Ancient Context: Lessons from Past Conflicts

Traditionally, an advanced air force would prioritize neutralizing enemy air defenses before supporting ground forces. failures to do so, such as Israel’s experience in the 1973 October War, resulted in significant setbacks.Conversely,successful campaigns like Israel in the 1982 Lebanon War and the U.S. in Desert Storm (1991) demonstrated the effectiveness of suppressing enemy air defenses using anti-radar missiles and jammers.

Europe’s Capability Gap

Europe currently lacks the necessary capabilities for effective air defense suppression, relying heavily on the U.S. for these systems. With potential shifts in U.S.foreign policy,including the possibility of reduced involvement in NATO,Europe may need to confront russian air defenses independently.

The RUSI report emphasizes the critical gap:

The limited training and capability development for the suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) in most European countries since the end of the Cold War has made the availability of [close air support] doubtful during the initial period of any war between peer adversaries.

Royal United Services Institute

This deficiency could leave European armies vulnerable, forcing them to either fight without air support or attempt to destroy air defenses themselves to enable pleasant aircraft operations.Land forces cannot wait for air forces to complete the SEAD/DEAD campaign before they themselves are committed — they must be able to operate for a sustained period while the airspace is still heavily contested, RUSI stated.