EFFECTS OF THE CALLED LACK OF EFFICIENT ENERGY

Recently launched the alert of the need to have a new supply of efficient electricity – low operating cost – no less than by the system operator (COES), reversing the denial that has been maintained in the last 7 years with a diversity of spokespersons, Among those who were up to the Central Reserve Bank, speculation has begun about who would be the beneficiaries of the situation that would arise in 2026 according to the COES, although I particularly believe that it would occur around September 2025.

Some will think that I am being a doomsayer too far in advance, for them, I specify that the commissioning of a new generation plant, be it thermal or from renewable resources (RER), requires no less than two years, making it very clear that we are on the verge of the time required for decision making.

By 2025, a comparison between supply and demand of capacity (power), indicates a surplus of the order of 68%, which is the way the preachers of the surplus based their preaching and demanded that construction should not be promoted from one more center.

The correct evaluation must be made by comparing the amount of energy that generators with low variable production costs-RER plants, natural gas (NG) or coal-can contribute to the market-and there will be a deficit in 2025, which if nothing is done, the outlook will worsen in 2026, and there may be a lack of new efficient capacity of the order of 160 megawatts (MW).

I am not affirming that there will be a lack of supply, but that the demand will have to be covered with production with diesel plants 2 (D2). So that they have a cost reference, the optimal D2 plant has a cost of 7.5 times with respect to an efficient NG plant.

In the national generating park, to date there are 2,545 MW of generation at D2, the main operators being the Spanish Cobra, with the Eten Power Plant (Lambayeque) of 214 MW; the French Engie, with 1,060 MW installed in Ilo and the multinational Inkia, owner of Kallpa, with 600 MW located in Mollendo. These will be the calls to fill the gaps in low-cost production.

The effect of the situation that I have described, which will result in an increase in prices, will begin with the so-called free customers (consumption greater than 0.2 MW), which to date are close to 1,800 companies, including mining companies, industries, and agro-industries. This type of consumer has a cost at the producer level that is 29.5% lower than the rest of the market-including households-. A non-alarmist expectation would be that your monthly bill has a readjustment of the order of 25%.

The price variation will depend a lot on the readjustment clause of those who have a contract in force in 2025 or 2026. The usual thing is that the determining variables are the price of GN in lot 88 (Camisea), of the wholesale price index rate (IPM), the sol/dollar exchange rate and American inflation that does not include food or energy; all this in a context of energy supply from an efficient source.

The “exceptionality” -put in quotes because it was predictable-, which in this case consists of meeting the supply with production at D2, has different rules, consisting of readjusting the price of energy due to the variation in the variable cost of production (marginal cost), in this case, going from 28 dollars per megawatt hour (US$/MWh) which corresponds to NG plants to a minimum of 211 US$/MWh for D2 units.

We are facing an expectation of a difficult situation, which can be alleviated with the entry of additional RER generators to the 836 MW already scheduled to operate between this year and next, in addition to requiring regulatory changes that have been requested since 2016. Call of attention so that the conjuncture policy; full of generalities, conjectures and opinions; take important decisions to the background