The Persistence of Maximalist Goals in Russia’s Foreign Policy
Russia’s actions on the international stage are deeply rooted in a worldview characterized by an outdated imperial mindset and a refusal to fully acknowledge the right to self-determination for nations formerly under its influence. This viewpoint fundamentally shapes its approach to conflict and negotiation, notably concerning Ukraine.
Currently, meaningful progress in negotiations is hampered by Russia’s unwillingness to relinquish maximalist territorial and political demands. Moscow appears to believe a total victory is still achievable through military force, evidenced by demands for control over territory not currently occupied and the complete capitulation of Ukraine. This stance necessitates sustained pressure on Russia, rather then premature concessions, to encourage a realistic assessment of its capabilities and objectives.
Despite growing partnerships, the relationship between Russia and China is not a monolithic alliance. While joint military exercises and important trade exist, military collaboration remains carefully managed, constrained by each nation’s individual strategic interests. There are no mutual defense agreements or deep operational integration between their armed forces.
Similarly, India’s engagement with both Russia and China should be understood through the lens of strategic autonomy, not a definitive shift towards an anti-Western alignment. Basic tensions persist between new Delhi and Beijing, particularly regarding unresolved border disputes and competition in the Indian Ocean. Recent diplomatic overtures may be tactical responses to economic pressures rather than a permanent realignment away from established partnerships with countries like Australia, Japan, the European Union, and others.
The potential for leveraging existing tensions between Russia and China remains a viable strategy. Competing interests, particularly in Central Asia where both nations seek influence, create opportunities for diplomatic maneuvering. Policymakers are increasingly exploring a strategy of “driving wedges” between Moscow and Beijing, recognizing that their partnership is limited and not a fully stable alliance.
China’s military cooperation with Russia primarily serves Beijing’s own interests, allowing for the testing of tactics and equipment while maintaining a safe distance from direct involvement in conflicts that could jeopardize its broader strategic goals. Support for Russian drone production and the transfer of dual-use technologies represent calculated assistance, prioritizing strategic adaptability over unconditional support for Russian objectives.
Sources:
[1] https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/partnership-short-of-alliance-military-cooperation-between-russia-and-china/
[2] https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/crossroads-indias-relations-us-china-and-russia
[3] https://www.cfr.org/article/china-russia-ukraine-june-2025
[4] https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2025/08/russia-and-china-have-drawn-closer
[5] https://cepa.org/programs/democratic-resilience/russia-china-cooperation-and-competition/
