Most of the Lebanese, officials, leaders, and citizens, almost said, after the political, economic, and social collapse that ravaged the country and its people, that we are all in the midst of fate. In Lebanon, “fate” is not a metaphysical, spiritual or material force, but rather a union of human forces, political, economic, social, and military, internal and external, that compete and wrestle, creating realities, repercussions, and geopolitical and geostrategic transformations. And after the division of the judiciary into two conflicting camps, there is nothing left for the Lebanese except the many-faced “fate”, which plays and manipulates them without mercy.
It is no exaggeration to say that Lebanon has become in a labyrinth of complete chaos, which is evident in the vacancy of the presidency of the republic, the stumbling of a resigned government that theoretically assumes the conduct of business, and the paralysis of a parliament with a mosaic composition, which rendered it incapable of electing a new president for the republic. On top of all that, the conflicting political parties seem incapable of conducting a meaningful national dialogue with each other, in order to reach exits and settlements, which led to the exacerbation of the chronic crisis, the intensification of the conflict, and the extension of the labyrinth of chaos.
Where from here?
In light of the actions and reactions that have taken place and are still taking place, five possible paths appear in the space of political developments that may be revealed by the brutal “fate”:
The first path, more chaos and extending the time of the maze, in terms of:
The continued inability to elect a new president for the republic.
The intensification of division in the judiciary into two rival camps, each of which is supported by conflicting political forces in the government and the opposition.
The increase in demonstrations opposing the government, the people of power, the disputing judges, and the politicians hostile to Hezbollah, which was falsely accused of being a terrorist organization, which prompted the Director General of Public Security, Major General Abbas Ibrahim, to warn, saying: “Beirut is the mother of the laws, so do not make it the mother of the streets.”
The second track, the political and security situation rolled into a divisive fait accompli, in terms of:
The decline of the government’s authority over the administrative and security regions.
The party or group that has the strongest popularity and influence in all governorates and districts, and the administrative departments and security agencies within their jurisdiction.
The occurrence of divergence between population groups portends civil clashes.
The third track is the revival of efforts to reconcile the conflicting political parties, in terms of:
Achieving a rapprochement between Hezbollah, the Amal Movement, and the Progressive Socialist Party (Walid Jumblatt) on the one hand, and the Free Patriotic Movement (Gebran Bassil) on the other, to elect a national figure independent of the competing political parties for the presidency.
The inability of the political forces opposing Hezbollah, the Amal Movement, and the Free Patriotic Movement to synthesize a majority that prevents the election of a consensual national figure who is not loyal to the policy of the United States, France, and Britain in Lebanon and the region.
The conflicting Lebanese political parties seem incapable of conducting a meaningful national dialogue with each other, in order to reach exits and settlements, which led to an exacerbation of the crisis and an intensification of the conflict.
The possibility of the conflicting parties failing to reach any settlement, especially after Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri was quoted as implicitly fearing that the term of the current parliament might expire without the ability to elect a new president to fill the vacancy that has persisted since the end of last October.
The fourth track is the initiative of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and France, together or individually, to reconcile the conflicting Lebanese parties, which leads to:
Holding a dialogue in Riyadh or Doha with the intention of reaching a way out of the existing impasse.
Reaching a multifaceted settlement regarding the election of a new president, a new coalition government, a strategy for national defense and the role of the resistance in it, and following up the investigation of the port bombing cases, looted public funds, the Capital Control Law, and the recovery of depositors’ money from banks.
Possible failure of the aforementioned dialogue, which leads to an exacerbation of the crisis and the political and security repercussions that may arise from it.
The fifth track is an Israeli attack targeting the resistance in Lebanon within the scope of the Zionist-American plan to contain Iran and its allies, in terms of:
Attempting to destroy the capabilities of the resistance and its fighters, or at least weaken them.
Destroying some of the remaining vital facilities in Lebanon and holding Hezbollah responsible for that in the context of the war.
Turning the Lebanese political forces against each other in the context of the old-new plan to break up Lebanon, Syria and Iraq into conflicting entities for tribal, sectarian or ethnic reasons.
Some aspects of these five possible paths may be achieved, or they may not be achieved at all. However, the vibrant national forces in Lebanon and the rest of the Arab Levant countries must hedge and unite to thwart them, by building a broad popular coalition of vibrant national forces capable of committing to a renaissance path and program of action that envisages re-establishing a capable and just national state in each of them.
Lebanese writer
